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***** The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions with which they are associated nor the views of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. ***** The Project on Nuclear Issues would like to acknowledge and thank Karina Marshall for designing the cover and Mark Jansson for copyediting. ***** The Project on Nuclear Issues publishes a quarterly significant issues series, Nuclear Notes, to provide policy-relevant analysis on nuclear developments. If you are interested in receiving this publication, please let us know by email at poni@csis.org. ***** Cover Photo: Defenselink
About the Project on Nuclear Issues
Perhaps the most critical challenge in sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent after the end of the Cold War is maintaining the human infrastructure to support U.S. nuclear capabilities. For a host of reasons ranging from the increased role of conventional forces in the postCold War era to the global campaign to “de-legitimate” nuclear weapons, the attractiveness of the nuclear field has declined markedly for younger generations. Expertise on everything nuclear (policy, operations, design, production, and so forth) increasingly resides in senior officials who have retired or are facing retirement, and the number of people in the pipeline is shockingly small. CSIS has become convinced that unless the nuclear community acts now to preserve the human capital associated with the U.S. nuclear deterrent, sustaining these capabilities will become increasingly difficult in a future that will continue to demand a strong nuclear presence in U.S. national security. CSIS has therefore launched the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) to address this challenge. The goals of the project are twofold. First, PONI aims to build and sustain a networked community of young nuclear experts from the military, the national laboratories, industry, academia, and the policy community. Second, PONI works to contribute to the debate and leadership on nuclear issues by generating new ideas and discussions among both its members and the public-at-large. PONI holds a number of events throughout the year in an ongoing effort to create a networked community of nuclear experts while contributing to the debate on nuclear issues. An annual conference series consisting of three regional conferences and a final conference at U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha provides a research agenda for PONI members to pursue. The regional conferences build up to the annual conference, where PONI members deliver presentations on strategic nuclear issues to a number of senior experts from across the nuclear community. In 2008, the conference series will explore various issues related to nuclear terrorism, nuclear power and nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament, and nuclear infrastructure. In addition to the conference series, PONI also hosts a series of breakfast events that provide a unique opportunity for young professionals to interact with senior officials in the nuclear community. Finally, PONI runs the Nuclear Scholars Initiative, a program that brings graduate students to Washington, DC for seminars and research opportunities related to nuclear issues.
Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………...1 Deterring, Compelling and Cooperating with States to Bar Non-State Routes to the Bomb by Phillip Bleek………………………………………………………………...3 UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Building Capacity to Counter Terror by Elizabeth Turpen…………………………………………………………………….15 Nuclear Weapon Design and Certification in the CTBT Era by Caroline Handley…....29 Open Literature Publication and Nuclear Proliferation by Thomas J. A. Plant ...…….35 Responding to Nuclear 9/11 by Francis Slakey.……………………………………...49 Nuclear Forensics: How Strong is the New Foundation of Nuclear Deterrence? by Matthew Allen………………………………………………………………………57 Discussion on Key Elements and Enablers of the UK Version of a ‘Responsive Infrastructure’ by Heather Pragnell…………………………………………………...71 Nuclear Proliferation in Asia: China and India by Gareth R. Williams………………..81 Russia’s Future: The Precarious Balance between Russian Energy and Military Strategy by Susan S. Voss…………………………………………………………....95
Introduction
The papers collected in this volume represent work done by PONI members during the fifth year of the project. Through a series of four conferences over the course of 2007, PONI members developed and refined their ideas on role of nuclear weapons in the international security environment and other nuclear weapons complex-related issues. The strongest papers were presented at the final conference of the year, which was held at U.S. Strategic Command headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska on November 29, 2007. The Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted the first 2007 PONI conference on April 23rd at its office in Washington, DC. The two day event was organized into a series of working groups and a plenary session designed to stimulate discussion and confirm the PONI research agenda for the year. From this conference and follow-on discussions, the 2007 research agenda was organized around four central issues: (1) recent developments and policy challenges associated with the separation of states into nuclear weapon classes; (2) the interaction dynamics between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states; (3) the role of non-state actors in acquiring or facilitating access to nuclear weapons; and (4) challenges associated with maintaining the nuclear infrastructures in the United States and in the United Kingdom. Throughout the year PONI members developed papers to address topics related to these issues and presented them at the next two conferences (the second at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the third at the Institution of Engineering and Technology in London) in order to advance and refine their ideas based on feedback from those in attendance. The strongest presentations were then selected to be briefed at the last conference of the annual series, which is co-hosted by USSTRATCOM. This year, twelve presentations were delivered to more than one hundred PONI members and a number of senior members of the U.S. and UK nuclear weapons establishments in attendance. This journal is a compilation of papers that accompany those presentations. The following papers address a broad range of issues and challenges in front of PONI members and the rest of the nuclear weapons community. They aim to delve deeper into nuclear weapons issues, their associated details, and to identify prospective solutions to existing and future challenges.
All presentations that were delivered at the conference are available on the PONI website at http://www.csis.org/isp/poni.
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Deterring, Compelling, and Cooperating with States to Bar Non-State Routes to the Bomb
PHILLIP C. BLEEK1
ABSTRACT
There is an emerging consensus that nuclear fission terrorism poses particularly serious threats. Directly targeting potential nuclear terrorists is necessary but inadequate. Every plausible attack scenario involves some degree of state complicity, on a spectrum including negligence in securing nuclear-explosive material at the lower end and full-blown leadership complicity at the higher. This offers additional opportunities for reducing the threat, including deterring, compelling, and cooperating with states to bar non-state routes to the bomb. In assessing policies in these categories, this paper builds on the premise that if nuclear fission terrorism is a serious threat, then action is needed not only to prevent it, but also to be prepared for the day after an attack. Pre-attack actions, including deterrence, compellence, and cooperation, will shape the post-attack environment. Further, the preattack environment provides opportunities for shaping the post-attack environment that will be absent once an attack has occurred. The post-attack environment provides unique opportunities for short- and long-term threat reduction, but the groundwork needs to be laid in advance. Finally, how the United States responds to a first attack will dramatically shape the threat environment, including the short- and long-term likelihood of further attacks.
A N E M E RG I N G N U C L E A R F I S S I O N T E R RO R I S M T H R E A T C O N S E N S U S
There is an emerging consensus that some non-state actors are motivated to acquire nuclear fission explosives, have sufficient resources to potentially be able to realize this goal, and would use these weapons if they managed to acquire them. Concern regarding the potential for nuclear terrorism, used here to refer to attacks with weapons deriving their explosive yield from fission and not to far less damaging radiological “dirty bombs” which merely
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Philipp C. Bleek is a Nonresident Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. This paper was written while he was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Thanks to Linton Brooks and John Harvey for particularly detailed comments and to John Hamre, Clark Murdock, Matt Squeri, and other participants at the London Institute of Engineering and Technology and U.S. Strategic Command conferences at which earlier drafts of this paper were presented. Comments or questions are welcome at pcb9@georgetown.edu.
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spread radioactive material using conventional explosives, appears to be shared by U.S. policymakers and non-governmental analysts and to a lesser but increasing degree by those outside the United States. Concern over the nuclear terrorism threat rests on a relative technical consensus that if nonstate actors acquired sufficient highly enriched uranium (HEU), they could use it to construct an improvised nuclear fission gun-type device with a yield from a few to tens of kilotons, at the high end of that range resembling the weapon the United States dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Plutonium is viewed as a more challenging route to a bomb, since it cannot be used in the more rudimentary gun-type design and must instead be incorporated into an implosion-based weapon, but most analysts suggest such a design could also be manufactured by a sophisticated non-state group.2 There is somewhat less consensus about how likely non-state actors are to acquire sufficient nuclear-explosive material.3 Disagreement about this issue goes a long way toward explaining disagreement about the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. It also bears highlighting that even if non-state actors could plausibly acquire nuclearexplosive material and use it to construct a nuclear fission device, much could also go wrong, so in addition to being technically challenging, the undertaking would be fraught with considerable risk. Most terrorist groups appear to be risk-averse and hence unlikely to invest, or invest adequately, in such an effort. But many interpret the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington as demonstrating a willingness on the part of at least some groups to invest substantial resources in the pursuit of such “spectaculars.” At a minimum, these and other attacks in recent years are reasonably taken as evidence that if some nonstate actors managed to acquire nuclear explosives, they would use employ them, to devastating effect. Despite disagreements about likelihood, rooted substantially in disagreement about the challenges of nuclear-explosive material acquisition, policymakers and analysts have largely coalesced around the view that since the consequences of nuclear fission terrorism are so serious, even a modest risk justifies vigorous efforts to prevent an attack. This paper is premised on this widely accepted, although certainly not universal, view of the nuclear
Arguing that a uranium gun-type device poses greater technical challenges than generally appreciated and that constructing a plutonium implosion device is of comparable difficulty, contrary to most analyses, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, D.C.: OTA, 1977) p. 29, accessed October 24, 2007 at http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1977/7705/7705.PDF. 3 This paper uses the term nuclear-explosive to refer to material that could be used in a fission-based explosive device, rather than the conventionally but often incorrectly used terms fissile or fissionable. Fissionable, the broadest category, includes materials that are not nuclear-explosive. More narrowly, all fissile materials are nuclear-explosive, but not all nuclear-explosive materials are fissile; for example, the even-numbered isotopes of plutonium are not fissile but are, under the correct conditions, nuclear-explosive. HEU is both fissile and nuclear-explosive.
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terrorism threat.4 The paper considers one set of avenues for reducing the possibility of a nuclear terrorism attack, not by targeting potential perpetrators directly, but by engaging states that will invariably have some degree of complicity in any attack. Further, if nuclear terrorism is a serious threat, then action is needed not only to prevent it, but also to prepare for the perhaps unlikely but far from impossible event that an attack occurs. Some increased awareness of this need has recently been evident, most notably in an effort by Ash Carter, Bill Perry, and Michael May that convened a group of experts to explore a “day after” scenario.5 But this and similar efforts appear to be focused primarily on consequence management, rather than on the broader policy issues related to shaping the post-attack environment, in particular to make follow-on attacks less likely. Beyond consequence management, discussions of the post-attack environment tend to focus on the need to assign blame and exact retribution, in part because the public is viewed as likely to be demanding such action. This paper is premised in part on the notion that policymakers’ top priority after an attack will be preventing follow-on attacks, and that while this priority is somewhat complementary with retribution, it may also conflict with it. So in addition to considering how nuclear terrorism might be prevented, this paper also considers how pre-attack actions are likely to shape the post-attack environment in both helpful and pernicious ways.
S H A P I N G T H E P R E - A N D P O S T- A T TA C K E N V I R O N M E N T B Y E N G A G I N G S TA T E S
Engaging potential nuclear terrorists directly entails considerable challenges. This is not to suggest that such direct action is unnecessary; efforts from enhancing port and border security through police and targeted military actions through to deterrence, perhaps by punishment and certainly by denial, can all be implemented by the United States, largely on its own, to hamper the efforts of potential nuclear terrorists.6
The nuclear fission terrorism threat consensus is broad but not universally shared. Expressing skepticism about the posited threat, see Robin M. Frost, “Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11” Adelphi Paper 378 (Taylor and Francis, 2005). Even more skeptical is John Mueller; see for example, on terrorism broadly but including nuclear terrorism, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions About Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence Volume 17 (2005): 487-505. 5 Ashton B. Carter, Michael M. May, and William J. Perry. The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City (Cambridge, MA: Preventive Defense Project, May 31, 2007) accessed January 5, 2008 at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/dayafterworkshopreport_may2007.pdf and “The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City” Washington Quarterly Volume 30, Issue 4 (Autumn 2007): 19-32. 6 On deterring terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, see Brad Roberts, “Deterrence and WMD Terrorism: Calibrating Its Potential Contributions to Risk Reduction” (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2007).
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Their importance notwithstanding, such efforts are likely to be insufficient. Additional leverage on the nuclear terrorism threat can be derived from the fact that every plausible nuclear terrorism scenario depends on states, and therefore that states can be engaged to reduce nuclear terrorism risks. In exploring the engagement of states with regard to nuclear terrorism threats, policymakers must consider how to shape the pre-attack environment not only to prevent initial attack, but also to be prepared for a post-attack environment in which the top policy priority will be preventing follow-on attacks. This focus on both the pre- and post-attack environment follows from several observations. First, the pre-attack environment offers policymakers dramatically different opportunities than the post-attack environment. Second, actions undertaken in the pre-attack environment will shape the post-attack environment, both for better and for worse. Third, the post-attack environment provides opportunities for action not available in the pre-attack environment, but many of those opportunities will only be available if the groundwork has been laid in advance.7 Fourth and finally, as Richard Danzig has observed in the context of bioterrorism, how U.S. antagonists assess the response to the first significant attack will dramatically shape the post-attack environment, including the likelihood of further attacks.8
T H E S TA T E R O L E I N N U C L E A R T E R RO R I S M
This paper is premised on the notion that central to preventing nuclear terrorism is the realization that every plausible acquisition scenario depends to a substantial degree on states. States have custody of weapons that could be diverted by terrorists, although this is perhaps the least likely acquisition path for a non-state bomb. States have stockpiles of nuclearexplosive material, although again most of these are probably fairly well secured. States transact and regulate civil commerce in weapons-usable material; in contrast to weapons and state nuclear-explosive material stockpiles, obtaining such material and using it to construct an improvised nuclear device is perhaps the most likely acquisition path for a non-state bomb. Finally, states have an array of policing, intelligence, and other capabilities they can bring to bear to greater and lesser degrees against the nuclear terrorism threat.
Arguing this point in the context of bioterrorism, see Richard J. Danzig, Rachel Kleinfeld, and Philipp C. Bleek, “After an Attack: Preparing Citizens for Bioterrorism” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 13, 2007), pp. 1-68, accessed January 5, 2007 at http://www.cnas.org/attachments/contentmanagers/141/AfterAnAttack.pdf. 8 Richard J. Danzig, “Catastrophic Bioterrorism: What Is To Be Done?” U.S. Government Printing Office (September 2003): 1-37.
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As a result, states have varying degrees of potential complicity in any prospective nuclear terrorism attack, ranging from full-blown leadership culpability to factional involvement to insider assistance and finally to various levels of negligent behavior. The state role in nuclear terrorism leads to the central question of this paper: How should the United States deal with other states to prevent nuclear terrorism? Answering that question requires first answering the question of what goals are being pursued. Those goals fall into four broad categories. First, prevent states from purposefully giving weapons or material or other aid to terrorists with nuclear aspirations. Second, motivate states to secure their weapons, materials, and also personnel so that these do not fall into the hands of non-state actors. Third, motivate states to cooperate with the United States as well as other states before an attack, especially to improve capabilities to trace weapons and materials back to specific states. Fourth and finally, motivate states to cooperate with the United States and others after an attack, both to trace weapons and materials back to their source and prevent further leakage.
DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, COOPERATION
The tools of statecraft available to deal with states fall into three broad categories: deterrence, compellence, and cooperation. Policies in each of these broad categories will be assessed individually, but even more important is how they impact each other, because while elements of each are complementary, others are contradictory, requiring some trade-offs between them. The discussion of each of these policy categories that follows is relatively broad brush, and should be viewed as a first cut at assessing the contributions each can make and the way they interact rather than any sort of definitive assessment. Deterrence refers to the threat of punishment if the action sought to be deterred is undertaken. This is the traditional use of the term, sometimes called “deterrence by punishment” to differentiate it from what is termed “deterrence by denial.” Compellence refers to threats of punishment in order to coerce states undertake those actions that are being compelled. Although every deterrent threat can be restated as compellence, and conversely every coercion threat can be restated as a deterrent one, leading some to argue the distinction is not meaningful, there is relative consensus that compellence is more challenging than deterrence.9
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As David Baldwin observes, “From a purely semantic standpoint, any deterrent threat can be stated in compellent terms, and any compellent threat can be stated in deterrent terms.” David A. Baldwin, “Power
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Finally, cooperation refers to joint efforts to mitigate risks, for example through U.S. provision of technical assistance or funding to secure vulnerable weapons, materials, or expertise in other states or cross-state efforts to strengthen attribution capabilities. Deterrence Deterrence has a role to play in engaging states to bar non-state routes to the bomb. Deterrence appears particularly applicable to full-blown leadership complicity in nuclear terrorism attacks. If leaders fear that they will be held responsible for aiding nuclear terrorism, they are less likely to do so. That said, the importance of deterrence in engaging states to bar non-state routes to the bomb should not be overstated, because non-state actors are far less likely to receive intact nuclear weapons or even substantial aid sanctioned by state leaders, who face enormous risks in providing such aid, than they are to receive assistance from renegade officials or to steal weapons or materials. Further, several nuances must be taken into consideration in considering the application of deterrence to states to bar non-state routes to the bomb. First, the degree to which the United States must be able to hold leaders accountable in order for deterrence to function in this context is often misunderstood. It is sometimes assumed that for deterrence to be successful, the United States must be able to consistently hold leaders responsible for their actions. But this overstates the challenge significantly. In order for deterrence to be successful, the likelihood of being held responsible perceived by the target of deterrence need merely exceed the target’s risk tolerance threshold. Exceptionally risk-acceptant leaders might plausibly have risk thresholds as high as, say, 25 percent (the figure is arbitrary, intended merely to be illustrative and ballpark) if they viewed the potential gains as commensurate with such high risks. But even that figure may be too high; leaders are unlikely to obtain or hold onto their leadership positions by consistently, or even infrequently, taking one-in-four gambles in which regime survival and state sovereignty are at stake. Of course U.S. ability to hold leaders responsible should be as high as it can be, but this observation is a heartening one for those concerned about the U.S. ability to reliably ascertain the degree of responsibility for nuclear terrorism attacks. Second, note the importance of perceptions rather than capabilities. The two are of course related, and even if feasible, a deception strategy that sought to perpetuate the perception of extremely effective U.S. attribution capability while neglecting underlying capabilities would entail considerable risk of exposure (not to mention the fact that attribution’s central
Analysis and World Politics: New Trends and Old Tendencies” World Politics Volume 31, Number 1 (January 1979): 188.
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importance may be less in deterring and more in identifying leaks and acting to ensure that follow-on attacks do not occur). But conversely, at least in a deterrence context, highly effective attribution capabilities that could not be or were not communicated to potential adversaries would have little value. The interplay of capabilities and perceptions merits further attention, in part because the issue is not unique to deterring nuclear terrorism, or, for that matter, even deterrence more broadly. Third, in the nuclear terrorism domain declaratory policy tends to receive excessive attention relative to underlying capabilities and interests that make deterrence more or less credible. In other words, analysts tend to focus more on explicit deterrent threats while neglecting implicit ones. During the Cold War, a plausible case could be made that retaliating against the Soviet Union was not always a rational response to nuclear or large-scale conventional aggression, either because of forces the Soviets might have held in reserve or because there was little to be gained by retaliating once deterrence had failed. So during the Cold War policymakers had to find ways to tie their own hands, to make retaliation more likely after a Soviet provocation, both through declaratory policy and through the posturing of nuclear forces.10 But if the United States were able to link a nuclear terrorism attack to the cooperation of a hostile state, and especially a state likely to be far weaker than the United States both conventionally and in the nuclear realm, the credibility threshold for retaliatory action would be much lower. In fact, it is difficult to make a credible case for U.S. non-retaliation under such circumstances, regardless of whether U.S. policymakers had threatened retaliation in advance. So it becomes commensurately less important to articulate deterrence threats against leadership culpability in a nuclear terrorism attack. This is not to suggest that such threats should not be made, merely that they are less important than conventionally assumed. This does suggest that if strong explicit threats entail other costs, such as undercutting potential cooperation in the aftermath of an attack, there may be more of a case for not articulating them or doing so in a more measured fashion. One counterargument to the above might be that such declaratory statements are not merely important as credible commitments, but serve an informational role, informing opponents of the consequences they will face if they undertake certain actions. This argument supposes that leaders of hostile states might not realize, or might miscalculate, just how seriously the United States would take their overt involvement in a nuclear fission terrorism attack on it. It is admittedly fashionable to brand leaders of antagonistic “rogue” states as irrational—and some of their admitted behavioral quirks are used to bolster the case—but there is little inductive evidence to suggest they are sufficiently irrational not to be able to make such basic
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This view of deterrent threats as costly and hence credible commitments underpins Scott Sagan’s arguments in Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks” International Security Volume 24, Number 4 (Spring 2000): 85-115.
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causal inferences, and deductively they are unlikely to have obtained or to be able to hold their leadership positions if they indeed lack such basic cognitive capabilities. Fourth and finally, it bears highlighting that successful deterrence depends not merely on unilateral U.S. capabilities and reputation for resolve, but also on cooperation with other states. Even if one or a few states do not cooperate to help identify the source of an attack, the cooperation of the remaining states will be vital to identifying the source, relatedly to identifying states that were not the source of the attack, and finally perhaps also to acting to both punish the attacker and ensure that further attacks do not occur. Compellence Compellence refers to threats of punishment to motivate states to take actions they would not otherwise have taken. A number of analysts have suggested a role for compellence in motivating states to take greater actions to prevent nuclear terrorism, including better securing vulnerable weapons, materials, and personnel.11 But compellence threats may be less effective at reducing nuclear terrorism risks than is often assumed, while entailing substantial costs.12 Compellence threats are likely to be less effective than is often assumed. Even in the absence of compellence threats, states already have substantial motivations to secure their nuclear weapons, materials, and related personnel. First, those states are likely, perhaps the most likely, targets if weapons, materials, or expertise leak. For example, if weapons, materials, or expertise leak within Russia (arguably the most likely source of such leaks), Russia itself is a very likely, and perhaps the most likely, target. Second, there is already an implicit retaliatory threat against states acting with a high degree of negligence. Such retaliation may not involve military means—although under certain circumstances it could—but a state whose negligence resulted in a catastrophic attack on the United States or its allies could count on very significant consequences. And there is a big potential downside to such compellence policies. After an attack, if the United States had previously made clear that it might retaliate against states that were merely
Robert L. Gallucci “Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability” Harvard International Review Volume XXVI, Issue 4 (Winter 2005) and “Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (September 2006) pp. 51-58; Anders Corr, “Deterrence of Nuclear Terror: A Negligence Doctrine” Nonproliferation Review Volume 12, Number 1 (March 2005), pp. 119-147; Caitlin Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11” Washington Quarterly Volume 20, Number 2 (2007) pp. 21-34. 12 More extensive discussion of the role of compellence in preventing nuclear terrorism is found in Philipp C. Bleek, “Would ‘Deterrence of Negligence’ Reduce the Risk of Catastrophic Terrorism?” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Nuclear Scholars Initiative 2005-2006 Papers (2006) pp. 18-33.
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“negligent” rather than fully culpable, it would risk dramatically undercutting the likelihood that it would receive the cooperation necessary to trace the attack to its source and ensure that further attacks did not take place. There is, however, at least one context in which compellence could be helpful and which will be briefly touched on in the conclusion below. Cooperation Cooperation is crucial to preventing a nuclear terrorism attack, because so many of the necessary tasks, from securing foreign weapons, materials, and expertise to monitoring potential nuclear terrorists, take place on foreign soil.13 The United States can also be doing much to bring other states into cooperative efforts to strengthen attribution capabilities, in particular by establishing a shared database that could underpin strengthened attribution. But cooperation is even more crucial after an attack. It is possible that the United States will be able to attribute an attack and ensure that no further leakage occurs on its own, but it is unlikely. So unless states take responsibility for aiding attacks or the United States has exceptionally strong intelligence indicating another state’s culpability, it will seek cooperation because of the overriding imperative to prevent follow-on attacks. U.S. policymakers may have to hold their noses while doing so, but in a broad range of circumstances they will nonetheless seek cooperation.14 This suggests that U.S. policymakers need to be thinking hard now about how to structure the post-attack environment to maximize the potential for cooperation. In part, this may require keeping deterrence and compellence threats sufficiently narrow that they do not unnecessarily undercut cooperation. More concretely, U.S. policymakers may have to give up the ability to hold states responsible for lower degrees of culpability in an attack in order to be able to hold them responsible for higher degrees of culpability and to get their cooperation to prevent further attacks. There are some states with which cooperation before a nuclear terrorism attack is unlikely, if perhaps not impossible. At present, Iran appears to be such a state; North Korea might also fall into this category, although the disarmament negotiations and process in which it is currently engaged suggests limited grounds for greater optimism. But even states with whom cooperation was not feasible before an attack may be candidates for it after an attack, when a failure to cooperate might far more credibly risk retaliation. This is one area where compellence arguably has a role to play, although perhaps as much implicitly as explicitly. This idea is elaborated on in the conclusion, below.
On one aspect of this broader cooperation agenda, see Philipp C. Bleek and Laura S. H. Holgate, “Minimizing Civil Highly-Enriched Uranium Stocks by 2015: A Forward-Looking Assessment of U.S.-Russian Cooperation” in The Future of the Nuclear Security Environment 2015, U.S. National Academy of Sciences (forthcoming spring 2008). 14 Also making this point, if only cursorily, see Carter, May, Perry, The Day After.
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CONCLUSIONS
Cooperation has been the focus of much of the above discussion, and purposefully so: reducing the nuclear fission terrorism threat is a fundamentally cooperative challenge, even in the case of what initially appear the least cooperative policies, deterrence and the use of force. In the case of deterrence, it appears most applicable to full-blown leadership culpability. As for compellence, this analyst is skeptical that it has much of a role to play, with a few exceptions noted above. One way to frame the narrower role for deterrence and compellence than is often posited is by revisiting early nuclear strategic analysis. As Thomas Schelling has observed, deterrence requires not only a credible threat of consequences if the target of deterrence does do what the United States does not want it to do, but also a credible reassurance that if the target does not do that thing, they will not face those consequences. Attempting to compel lesser degrees of culpability risks blurring the line that Schelling identified, and in so doing, makes cooperation considerably riskier for states. In other words, if countries themselves are not sure how culpable they may be at lower levels of responsibility, or how culpable U.S. policymakers will assess them to be, they are likely to be extremely reluctant to cooperate and potentially expose themselves to retaliation. Finally, although this paper suggests skepticism about compellence, a narrow form of it could be helpful. As Robert Gallucci has observed, particularly before but perhaps also after a nuclear terrorism attack, it could be productive to have private conversations with policymakers in other countries to make clear the dilemma the United States will face after an attack.15 That dilemma follows from the fact that U.S. policymakers will have a public that is demanding retribution and will themselves be focused on preventing follow-on attacks. In that kind of environment, if U.S. policymakers can trace an attack back to a country with reasonable confidence, and if that country is not cooperating fully, and even if U.S. policymakers are not entirely sure whether the country’s leaders were fully culpable, those policymakers may nonetheless feel compelled to act militarily against the country to which they have traced the attack. At least in theory, these private conversations can be framed not as threats but as genuine dilemmas and as strong arguments for cooperation from those countries both before and after an attack, although admittedly it will be difficult for such conversations to be entirely non-antagonistic.
Robert L. Gallucci “Averting Nuclear Catastrophe,” Harvard International Review Volume 26, Number 4 (Winter 2005): 83-84.
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Finally, this paper has attempted to make broad generalizations about the applicability of various tools to engaging states to reduce non-state nuclear threats. Of course the reality of policy making is not broad-brush but rather context-specific; policies that are appropriate for one state may be entirely inappropriate for another. This paper nonetheless presumes that generalizing about broad categories of policies has some value, in part because it is not possible to entirely target specific sets of policies at specific states. The bottom line is that deterrence, compellence, and cooperation all have important roles to play, but that policies in each category need to be assessed carefully, including individually, in terms of their interactions, and in their effect on the pre- and post-attack environment. That post-attack environment will hopefully never be realized, but just as it would be irresponsible not to take concerted action to prevent its realization, it would be similarly irresponsible not to prepare for the possibility that it might.
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UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Building Capacity to Counter Terror
ELIZABETH TURPEN, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT
In response to the rising threat of non-state actors’ acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1540 to close loopholes in the existing treaty regime. With the passage of 1540, the Security Council imposed a sweeping mandate for supply-side measures against proliferation on every other state in the world. States without means to implement the Resolution were mandated to request needed assistance; those with the capacity to offer assistance were required to do so. Almost four years since its passage, progress on implementation suffers not only from a lack of capacity on the part of many states, but from legal, political and attitudinal obstacles as well. An examination of the obstacles to 1540 implementation and the key lessons from the West’s experience in nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet Union guides the Stimson Center’s efforts on sustainable implementation of Resolution 1540. This project strives to bridge the development-nonproliferation divide for a more holistic approach to the needs assessment for 1540 implementation. More importantly, this approach provides mutually reinforcing conditions for progress and sustainability in achieving the Resolution’s objectives. Addressing the recipient states’ own development priorities to create the conditions for sustainable implementation of the Resolution’s measures is the most viable approach to engender the political will and ownership of the assistance and address capacity needs in a comprehensive manner.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
The AQ Khan affair illustrated the ease with which individuals can proliferate sensitive weapons of mass destruction (WMD) knowledge and hardware. For more than a decade, Khan’s black market in nuclear technologies provided one-stop shopping to numerous customers from North Korea and Iran to Libya. The case stands as a warning to the world that the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), regardless of strengthened verification mechanisms and/or adjustments to interpretations of Article IV, remains insufficient to address the interrelated challenges of technological advances and rogue non-state actors. The same holds true for both the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical 15
Weapons Convention (CWC), especially in light of the former’s lack of agreed upon international security standards and measures for verification. In addition, the growing interest in nuclear power to drive development while reducing carbon emissions associated with climate change increases the urgency of attaining global adherence to minimal standards of nuclear technology governance. Recent cases, including that of the Khan network, demonstrate not only a widening of the proliferation challenge from the state to sub-state level, but also a dramatic expansion of the geographic dimension of the problem. The past decade reveals that weak states are contributing to the proliferation threat, ranging from North Korea and so-called “ungoverned spaces” where terrorist groups can easily operate, to advanced Western democracies in which businesses have unwittingly provided the necessary technology and equipment to proliferators. Meanwhile, the existing nonproliferation, capacity building, and global development toolkit represents a patchwork of treaties, norms, and national strategies that often operate in near isolation. The inability to leverage government programs in mutual support across national and functional boundaries has led to a climate of significant opportunity for would-be proliferators. The savvy proliferator need only find the weakest link among the developed world’s export control policies or compliant (read complicit) bureaucrats to exploit the vast loopholes in the existing network of denial regimes.1 Only by addressing holistically the underlying conditions in each state that permit bad actors to proliferate can an effective international nonproliferation strategy be achieved. To help close this major gap and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1540 (hereinafter the Resolution or 1540), which mandates that all UN Member States implement a set of supplyside controls and criminalize proliferant activities within their territories. The Resolution was introduced with great fanfare, marking the second significant opportunity since September 11th to provide states at risk with the capacity to conform to global counterterrorism and nonproliferation norms. Even the Bush administration, long criticized for shunning international cooperation, seized upon the Resolution as a critical component of its security agenda. Despite early attention, however, 1540 has neither received the consistent support of the United States, nor the sustained commitment from the international community requisite to move the Resolution from a multifaceted directive to an effective instrument of nonproliferation. The Security Council Committee responsible for monitoring implementation of 1540 is overwhelmed and under-resourced—its mandate restricted to monitoring without detailed analysis or comparison of correlated needs and resources. Many
1
William Langewiesche, “The Wrath of Khan”, The Atlantic, (November 2005); William Langewiesche, “The Point of No Return”, The Atlantic, (January/February 2006).
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states question the legitimacy of the Resolution, and of those states willing to implement the Resolution many lack the capacity to do so. Ultimately, 1540 will have proven to be a hollow measure unless new models of engagement that span the hard/soft security divide can be developed that systematically pair states at risk with new capacity. This article focuses on the obligations put forward by UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and a project currently underway at The Henry L. Stimson Center designed to facilitate its sustainable implementation. After briefly discussing the genesis of 1540, the discussion will turn to the specific obligations mandated by the Resolution. A look at the impediments to implementation, in conjunction with lessons learned from the U.S. and the Global Partnership’s experience in the states of the former Soviet Union, delineates an appropriate methodology to overcome capacity and legitimacy concerns surrounding the Resolution and ensure long-term sustainability of assistance rendered. Applying lessons from the West’s experience in cooperative nonproliferation to a holistic, global approach to 1540 implementation offers the only viable solution to ensuring the minimal capacity of governance requisite to adequately address the “nexus of WMD proliferation, terrorism and illicit trafficking.”2
THE GENESIS OF THE RESOLUTION
The events of September 11, 2001, ushered in an acute and widespread awareness of the potential destructive means available to non-state actors. Shortly following these events (September 28, 2001), the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1373 requiring all UN member states to take steps to combat terrorism. Resolution 1373’s passage marks the first time since the Security Council’s inception in 1945 that it invoked its Chapter VII authority to legislate a functional rather than state-specific threat to international peace and security. Although Resolution 1373 is specific to the enactment and enforcement of counterterrorism measures, terrorism using weapons of mass destruction was already on the minds of the Resolution’s drafters. Two paragraphs of the resolution (3 (a) and 4) specifically address terrorist possession of WMD and trafficking in such materials.3 More importantly, the underlying state capacities necessary to effectively implement the counterterrorism measures targeted by Resolution 1373 closely parallel those requisite for compliance with 1540.
Peter van Ham and Olivia Bosch, “Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Role of Resolution 1540 and Its Implications,” in Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540, ed. Olivia Bosch and Peter van Ham (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007): 5. 3 Ibid., 8.
2
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The measures called for in Resolution 1373, however, were insufficient to close existing loopholes in the treaty regime regarding the potential role of non-state actors. In President Bush’s September 2003 address to the UN General Assembly he called for the Security Council to adopt a “new anti-proliferation resolution criminalizing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” This resolution “should call on all members of the UN to criminalize the proliferation of weapons – weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict export controls…and to secure any and all sensitive materials within their borders.” In addition, he stated that the U.S. stood “ready to help any nation draft these new laws and to assist in their enforcement.”4 The ensuing revelations about the AQ Khan network throughout 2003 and early 2004 offered additional impetus to move this idea forward, and on April 28, 2004, 1540 was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council. This was followed two years later by Resolution 1673, which reiterated the original obligations, but more importantly emphasized the need for implementation and extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for another two years.
A G L O BA L M A N DA T E O F S U P P LY- S I D E M E A S U R E S
Resolution 1540 set forth a global baseline of anti-proliferation measures and mandated all states to promptly enact and enforce these measures. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requires states to “criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.”5 The resolution also includes twelve points requiring all States to: “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any nonstate actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”; develop and maintain “effective physical protection measures”, “border controls and law enforcement efforts” to address illicit trafficking, and “national export and trans-shipment controls.”6 In brief, the Security Council “imposed a requirement for supply-side measures against proliferation on every other nation in the world.”7 While multilateral treaties to address nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation already exist, along with informal arrangements and verification organizations, the existing regimes do not adequately address the challenge of non-state actors in today’s proliferation
4 Statement by George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2003. 5 White House, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” February 11, 2004. 6 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, S/RES/1540, April 28, 2004, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc-resolutions04.html. 7 A resolution was used in lieu of a negotiated treaty or an agreed reinterpretation of Article 3 to address nuclear proliferation concerns, see Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004):43-44.
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threats. Resolution 1540 enhances the existing treaty framework in the following ways: 1) it imposes obligations on those states currently not party to one or more of the existing treaties; 2) it encompasses “all kinds of WMD and, importantly, their means of delivery and related materials”; 3) it mandates enactment and enforcement of prohibitions and controls for a wider range of activities; and 4) it establishes one body to monitor the implementation of these obligations on all three kinds of weapons, materials and their means of delivery. Although this is not a traditional treaty-based approach and its efficacy remains to be proven, there is certainly merit to the argument that the international community did not have “the luxury . . . for negotiation crossing many months or years to arrive at a solution” to these threats.8 The Resolution attempted to address the inadequacies of existing measures and the particular challenge of WMD proliferation by non-state actors.9 Several aspects of the resolution and subsequent commitments must be underscored. States were required to report within six months of the resolution’s adoption to a monitoring committee on the steps taken toward implementation. As 1540 imposes a substantial burden on all states, any state, “lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources,” may request assistance from those states in a position to do so. As of the December 17, 2007 meeting of the UN Security Council, Ambassador Burian, Chair of the 1540 Committee, reported that 140 states have submitted reports to the Committee, and about 90 have also provided additional information to the Committee. Over thirty states have specifically requested assistance, and it can be assumed that the remaining 52 states principally found in the Caribbean, Africa and Pacific Islands that have not reported also are in need of assistance.10 The G8 states, including a strong commitment from the US, have indicated that they are prepared to assist.11 Because effectiveness of the resolution will depend in large part on whether the “monitoring committee and supporting states will be able to secure global implementation,” substantial assistance on a broad range of activities must be forthcoming. The Resolution also established a committee to monitor implementation. The 1540 Committee, as it is called, consists of all fifteen members of the UN Security Council, and was given an initial mandate of two years. The mandate was subsequently extended for an additional two years via Resolution 1673 mentioned above. The foremost role of the 1540 Committee is to ensure that states have the necessary capacity and technology to complete
8 Andy Semmel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540: The U.S. Perspective” (remarks, Chatham House, London, England, October 12, 2004). 9 van Ham and Bosch, Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), 3. 10 5806th meeting of the United Nations Security Council, Monday, S/PV.5806, December 17, 2007, p. 5, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact2007.htm. 11 Gabriel H. Oosthuizen and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, “Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,” Briefing Paper 04/01, (London: Chatham House, September 2004): 6, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk.
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the objectives of the resolution. Knowing that some states lack such capacity, the 1540 Committee wrote in its guidelines that it would “invite States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling” the provisions of the resolution.12 Although the concept of serving as an assistance intermediary grew from the role played by the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) established by UN Security Resolution 1373, the CTC plays a much more active role in implementing Resolution 1373 by helping states to determine their needed assistance, by urging states with capacity to contribute, and by matching up donors with corresponding recipients.13 The 1540 Committee, on the other hand, is confined to a more passive role, serving more as a clearinghouse than a matchmaker.14 In short, the Resolution comprises a sweeping unfunded mandate. Realization of the desired counterproliferation objectives would require unprecedented coordination and cooperation among a large number of states, as well as the support of international, regional and nongovernmental organizations. Not only has such cooperation not been forthcoming, but the Resolution also suffers from other legal, political and attitudinal impediments.
I M P E D I M E N T S TO I M P L E M E N TA T I O N
Whereas one can easily cite four distinct hurdles to effective implementation, these issues represent interrelated concerns that often work in tandem to thwart progress toward effective, sustainable implementation of the Resolution’s mandate. The Legitimacy Deficit First and foremost, Resolution 1540 suffers from a legitimacy deficit. The legitimacy question is at once legal and political, with the latter being more salient than the former. The seven months of negotiations devoted to 1540 gave rise to numerous concerns. In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, a primary issue was the possible imposition of economic or even military sanctions for noncompliance. Not only is there no mention of any enforcement actions for noncompliance in the Resolution, but any notion of using sanctions to compel compliance is likely to meet with staunch and potent resistance for a variety of reasons described below. During these negotiations, China also required that the word
United Nations 1540 Committee. “Guidelines for the Conduct of Its Work,” http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/work.html. 13 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee. “Operational Conclusions for Policy Guidance Regarding Technical Assistance,” http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/documents/tech_assistance%20guidance.pdf. 14 United Nations 1540 Committee. “Note Verbale, 20 May 2005,” http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/note%20verbale%20assistance%20all%20states.doc.
12
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interdiction be deleted from now operative paragraph 10 calling for international cooperation to curb “illicit trafficking.” In addition, “States Parties” was inserted in operative paragraph 5; this allowed for retention of the national security prerogative on the part of states not yet parties to a nonproliferation treaty. Prior to its adoption, several states questioned whether it was the role of the Security Council to “prescribe legislative action by member states,” and others argued that they had become subject to laws that they had no hand in drafting – all indicative of the wide-ranging legal implications of the Security Council’s actions. Despite these reservations, all states have agreed under UN Charter Article 24 (1) that on issues of international peace and security, the Security Council acts on their behalf, and they also have agreed to be bound by its resolutions.15 The political question frequently stymies constructive dialogue in public forums focused on implementation. Many states, especially within the Non-Aligned Movement, see compliance with 1540 as, at best, secondary to the existing treaty obligations. The perceived lack of progress by the nuclear weapons states on their Article VI disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is immediately, albeit obliquely, referenced by some officials as a reason to question the legitimacy of the Resolution. While progress on existing nuclear disarmament commitments is, indeed, a longstanding obligation and necessary to cajole international cooperation to achieve many nonproliferation objectives, awaiting disarmament by the nuclear-haves prior to moving forward with global adherence to minimal standards in counter-proliferation is not an option. Low Priority Second, WMD proliferation is a low priority for most developing countries and 1540 itself is more insidiously viewed by some as another exercise driven by the North’s security interests to the detriment of the South. With all of their existing problems and other critical development priorities, why should they divest resources to deal with WMD proliferation? In order to overcome this particular barrier to progress, wealthy donor nations either need to offer better incentives or threaten laggards with consequences for failure to comply. As forcing compliance with the Resolution is likely to only create greater animosity and resistance to achieving these counter-proliferation objectives, the former – carrots rather than sticks – appear to be the more effective means by which to achieve progress on 1540 implementation. Lack of Capacity Third, many states do not have adequate technical expertise to assess their compliance with most facets of the Resolution. An additional complication is the number of different
15
van Ham and Bosch, Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), 3.
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agencies or actors within any government that must be involved in assessing the existing status of legal mechanisms and enforcement capabilities in each of the separate categories of compliance required by the Resolution. To put it simply, states that have not submitted their reports likely not only lacked the will, but also the capacity to do so. Many organizations and actors have been involved in raising awareness and facilitating understanding about the Resolution and its import in order to facilitate universal compliance with the reporting requirements as a first step. Of course, fulfillment of the reporting requirements only offers the hope of spurring implementation if the reports are of sufficient quality and specificity to begin the process of offering assistance where necessary. Mixed Quality of Reports The last major barrier to 1540 implementation has been the mixed quality in the reports received and a mismatch between offers for assistance and requests. To date, the preponderance of requests for assistance has been financial in nature, while the majority of offers of support have been technical, revealing a critical and potentially debilitating mismatch. In those instances where assistance other than financial has been put forward, the requests have been so general that donor states require additional information in order to be able to act on the request. The 1540 Committee has streamlined the reporting process by developing a matrix for the initial roster of requirements as well as producing a relatively simple form for assistance requests. However, almost four years since the Resolution’s passage a lot more work remains to be done just to achieve universal compliance with the reporting requirements. Raising the priority of the Resolution in the perception of potential recipient states in order to move toward effective implementation likely entails an approach that both recognizes good governance as a prerequisite to effective implementation of the Resolution and engenders ownership by the recipient state of the assistance provided. These are key lessons from the West’s fifteen years of nonproliferation assistance in the states of the former Soviet Union.
C O O P E R A T I V E N O N P R O L I F E R A T I O N A N D 1 5 4 0 I M P L E M E N TA T I O N
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the United States launched an array of cooperative nonproliferation efforts to contain the threat of “loose nukes.” Colloquially known as Nunn-Lugar after its authors former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), the Defense Department provided Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding and expertise to: 1) consolidate and secure weapons of mass destruction in safe areas; 2) inventory and account for these weapons; 3) provide safe handling and safe disposition of these weapons as called for by arms control agreements; and 4) offer
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assistance in finding gainful employment for thousands of former Soviet scientists with expert knowledge of weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems. The early momentum created by this effort laid the foundation for a broad array of programs spawned by other U.S. agencies, especially the Energy and State Departments, and, in some cases, pursued multilaterally by U.S. allies. In 1996, legislative action in the form of the so-called Nunn-Lugar-Domenici bill explicitly recognized the terrorist threat and expanded and enhanced threat reduction activities. At the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, other members of the G-8 committed themselves to match the United States’ commitment to cooperative nonproliferation totaling $10 billion over ten years, an agreement initially dubbed “10 plus 10 over 10.” More recently, Congress authorized CTR activities to extend beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union. In over a dozen years of evolution and roughly $13 billion in U.S. security investments, these efforts can lay claim to the following achievements: deactivation of over 6,900 warheads, including the entire arsenals from the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; destruction of more than 2,300 delivery systems; elimination of over 290 metric tons of highly enriched uranium; enhancements to security in transport and storage as well as accountability for both weapons and weapons materials; and engagement of approximately 71,000 scientists in civilian research. Nonproliferation assistance in the form rendered to the region of the former Soviet Union over the past 15 years is relatively new on the landscape. Dismantling Cold War legacies is obviously a different issue than implementing supply-side measures and interdiction capacity related to non-state actors in the context of rising proliferation challenges. However, it is important to cull the lessons from these ongoing cooperative nonproliferation endeavors in order to better utilize the existing tools and the accrued experience to better effect. Cooperative Threat Reduction and the Global Partnership: Lessons Learned A detailed examination of the lessons learned from the U.S. and G-8 initiatives in the former Soviet States gives rise to four key lessons that are readily applicable to 1540 implementation. First, the threat reduction programs of the US government and within the Global Partnership offer an underappreciated and underutilized toolkit in assisting with implementation of 1540. Second, even after 15 years of assistance designed to address the spectrum of threats arising from the Soviet Union’s demise, the U.S. nonproliferation programs still do not comprise a streamlined and efficient “whole of government” response to the issues. In the instance of Resolution 1540, not only do some states require a “whole of government” request for assistance, but ideally donor states would be attempting to sequence and leverage synergies in their assistance to weak states. Unfortunately, such holistic responses are rarely realized. Third, without mutual agreement regarding the underlying threat or risk, the assistance rendered is not sufficiently valued by the recipient 23
state to sustain the measures put in place. Host country buy-in is crucial. The development community has known this for several decades, but the nonproliferation community has not effectively inculcated the development community’s knowledge of the need for local ownership into its approach. Most importantly and inextricably linked to mutual agreement and “whole of government” approaches, the fourth overarching lesson is that sustainability requires folding traditional development assistance for institution and capacity-building into our nonproliferation agenda. With respect to this last point, the Pentagon’s own description of the three phases of their threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union is instructive. Phase one, dubbed the “Toys-R-Us” phase, consisted of immediate procurement of numerous items to handle the immediate security and transportation requirements for over 30,000 nuclear weapons spread across fifteen time zones and a rapidly eroding command and control situation. Phase two was largely focused on dismantlement or construction of large facilities. The current and final phase of the Defense Department’s efforts is focused almost exclusively on “capacity building.” Whereas “capacity building” became the last phase for what began as an emergency response to the threat of loose nukes, it should be the first step toward sustainable implementation of 1540. As one simple example, offering equipment and training for border guards is the simplest near-term solution, but it’s at best a band-aid and does not address the educational, institutional and long-term economic development issues that give rise to illicit activities, whether proliferation related or not. The impediments to implementation discussed earlier and the lessons learned from over a decade of nonproliferation assistance give rise to some very obvious conclusions with implications for our approach to 1540 assistance. If states cannot fulfill their reporting obligations, they either lack a motivation or a capacity to do so. And those states reporting do not necessarily have an enduring interest in sustaining the measures facilitated by any assistance rendered. This is precisely the conundrum in which the 1540 Committee, potential donor states, international, regional and non-governmental organizations reside in their efforts to achieve progress toward implementation.
C R E A T I N G A V I RT U O U S C I RC L E ?
The impediments to implementation and the lessons from the West’s experience in cooperative nonproliferation programs provide key guidance to the Stimson Center’s efforts on sustainable implementation of Resolution 1540. Dubbed “The Next 100” project, these efforts comprise a more efficacious approach to 1540 implementation. More importantly, this approach provides mutually reinforcing conditions for progress in achieving the
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Resolution’s objectives. As mentioned, legitimacy of 1540 remains a significant part of the existing impediments. And, again, many states either lack the will or capacity to implement the Resolution. This is where host country buy-in to receive assistance and then sustain the measures put in place becomes incredibly challenging. Unless, of course, the needs assessment starts from the premise that there are likely certain development priorities that align themselves directly with effective implementation of the measures mandated by 1540. Addressing the recipient state’s own priorities to create the conditions for sustainable implementation of the Resolution’s measures is the most viable approach to address the political will, capacity needs and ownership of the assistance in any comprehensive manner. The recipient state’s development priorities are not addressed as a quid-pro-quo, but as the starting point for a package of assistance that makes sense in light of the underlying capacities requisite for sustaining the technical overlay likely necessary for some facet of the 1540 mandate. Some examples from “The Next 100” project’s early investigation of possibilities should help to illustrate the approach. Building Capacity: SALW and WMD In the Stimson Center’s exploration of particular linkages with officials from different East African states, one official noted that “small arms are our WMD.”16 Similar comments regarding the security problem presented by small arms and light weapons have arisen in discussion with officials at the Organization of American States with respect to Latin America and the Caribbean.17 Here the synergies between addressing an existing prominent security priority and 1540 implementation should be quite evident. The amount of overlay in terms of assistance necessary to address illicit sales and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and many of the measures mandated by 1540 is profound. Legal Assistance – commercial law and export controls In another East African case, the priority is assistance to create the legal framework conducive to investment in manufacturing facilities for economic development. A comprehensive framework for commercial law could readily encompass customs, border and export controls, as well as the consequences for their violation, and many other things related to a stable investment environment. Is it possible to develop a package of assistance that facilitates the “rule of law” framework and enforcement thereof, coupled with 1540 related measures, to obtain mutually satisfying economic development and security objectives?
16 17
United Nations Mission officials from East Africa, (pers. comm.), New York, January 17, 2007. Officials at the Organization of American States responsible for security (pers. comm.), Washington, DC, November 21, 2007.
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Shifting Priorities and Perceptions: North and South The first order of priority is correcting the misplaced perception on the part of donor states that solely technical assistance is necessary to facilitate effective implementation of the Resolution. Neither one-off trainings nor high tech equipment will provide durable solutions to the long-term governance needs in many regions of the world. Due to the overwhelming barriers to implementation, recipient states need to experience the potential benefits of requesting and receiving valued assistance. The need exists to prove the value of the Resolution in meeting enduring development priorities as the foundation upon which counter-proliferation measures can be effective and sustainable. Only by witnessing the potential value of assistance rendered under the rubric of 1540 implementation can the perception of the Resolution as “a priority for the North to the detriment of the South” be overcome. Is it possible to create a virtuous circle through a handful of successful, highprofile pilot projects applying this methodology?
CONCLUSIONS
With a sweeping mandate such as Resolution 1540, it is necessary to mainstream nonproliferation-related measures into our institutional and capacity building efforts. This necessitates “whole of government” responses that are made difficult by bureaucratic stovepipes, which hinder the alignment and leveraging programs off one another. Although bridging the gap between the development and nonproliferation is no small feat, parallel efforts have been underway to create a methodology for the needs assessment related to implementation of Resolution 1373 in this same development-security context. Identifying the underlying state capacities required for effective implementation of Resolution 1373 and 1540, as well as for participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the linkages between these initiatives would help us leverage potential synergies and maximize investments. The legitimacy issue cannot be addressed head-on without some progress on commitments that predate 1540. However, in the immediate term, the capacities, priorities and ownership can be addressed if the approach takes the form of looking first at the development needs that provide the foundation for effective and sustainable implementation of the specific counterproliferation measures called for by the Resolution. By linking the existing development priorities to the technical assistance required for compliance with different facets of the Resolution, assistance that attains mutually beneficial objectives to both donors and recipients can be rendered. Proving that the 1540 agenda also can be advantageous to the recipient states will be the first step requisite to cajole cooperation on these initiatives. At 26
the same time, donor states need to acknowledge the long-term, serious commitment to helping establish minimal standards of governance and rule of law are the only foundation upon which to build an effective global counterterror and counterproliferation strategy.
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Nuclear Weapon Design and Certification in the CTBT Era
CAROLINE HANDLEY1
ABSTRACT
In the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) era, nuclear weapons states use a sciencebased methodology for both stockpile stewardship and new weapon design. This methodology will be described and the scientific reasoning behind it will be explained. It will be concluded that it is essential that nuclear weapons states maintain sufficient investment in the specialized facilities and scientists needed to support this methodology in order to guarantee that their nuclear stockpiles can be maintained.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
In the CTBT era, nuclear weapons states use a science-based methodology for both stockpile stewardship and new weapon design. This method is essential in preventing selfdeterrence by ensuring that nuclear weapons can be designed, built, stored in service and disassembled in a safe and secure manner, and that they will work as intended when required. As with any scientific field, nuclear weapons science relies on a rigorous peer review process as discussed by Tom Plant in a recent PONI paper.2 Scientific peer review is based on interaction with academic institutions, as well as other weapons laboratories, and on publishing papers in the open literature. One such paper, which gives an overview of nuclear weapons science, is used as the basis for this paper.3
?? British Crown Copyright 2008/MOD 1 Mrs. Caroline Handley is a scientist in the Design Physics Department at the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of AWE or the UK Ministry of Defence. 2 Tom Plant, PONI Paper, 2007. 3 Keith O'Nions, Robin Pitman and Clive Marsh, "Science of nuclear warheads," Nature, Vol. 415, (February 2002): 853-857.
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NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN
Details of modern nuclear weapon design are deemed classified by nuclear weapons states and so only limited information is released by weapons laboratories. A basic description of the functioning of an implosion-type design is given by Glasstone & Dolan.4
SUBCRITICAL MASS
COMPRESSED SUPERCRITICAL MASS
IMPLOSION CHEMICAL EXPLOSIVE (BEFORE FIRING) (IMMEDIATELY AFTER FIRING) THEN EXPLODES
In a fission device, conventional explosives are used to produce spherically converging shock waves which compress the core of the nuclear weapon, known as the pit. This causes the fissile material to become supercritical and a source of neutrons is used to start a chain reaction at the right moment, causing a nuclear explosion to occur. Thermonuclear weapons contain a fission primary and a secondary which contains thermonuclear fuel. Once the fissile material in the primary has been compressed to a supercritical state, the nuclear reactions cause a great deal of energy to be released as X-rays, which go on to initiate the secondary. This leads to a chain of events resulting in both nuclear fission and fusion reactions, causing the secondary to explode and the full yield of the nuclear weapon to be generated.
NUCLEAR WEAPON SCIENCE
In order to underwrite both existing nuclear weapons stockpiles and future weapons designs, scientists at weapons laboratories must understand not only all the materials involved in nuclear weapons in ambient conditions as they interact with each other in aging stockpiles,
4
Samuel Glasstone and Philip Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Third Edition, (Castle House Publications Ltd, 1980).
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but also at the extremely high rates, temperatures and pressures they will experience if the weapon is ever used. Primaries contain a wide selection of disparate materials: fissile and non-fissile, high and low density, gaseous and solid, explosive and inert. In order to understand the physics of the primary as it is detonated, it is necessary to understand complex shock wave interactions between these materials. Hydrodynamic effects that weapons physicists must understand include detonation propagation, interactions between explosives and inert materials, shock wave passage through metals (which have a complicated granular microstructure), mixing phenomena at shocked material boundaries and the surface break-up of materials. All this before any consideration is given to nuclear reactions! The approach of nuclear weapons laboratories is to develop accurate computer models that can be used to predict the physical processes, such as those listed above, which occur when a nuclear weapon is detonated. These models require huge supercomputers in order to run at the required resolution to capture the relevant physics and they must be validated against as wide a range of experimental data as possible, as well as against the database of previous nuclear tests. In order to conduct the highly specialized experiments that are necessary to validate the computer models, nuclear weapons laboratories necessarily maintain advanced experimental facilities. One example of these are chambers designed to contain explosive experiments, where simulant materials are used to study primary operation up to the point at which a real weapon would become nuclear critical.3 Specialized diagnostics are used including arrays of fine probes to reveal details of early motion and fiber optics, lasers and streak cameras. Powerful X-ray machines are used to take pictures of the inside of the simulant primary as it implodes. Another example is the shock tube experiments, which are used to investigate details of the mixing between materials, such as that which occurs when shock waves travel from low-density to high-density material. To predict the yield of the nuclear weapon, it is necessary to understand precisely how the X-rays travel from the primary to the secondary. A crucial parameter is the radiative opacity.3 The difficulty of experiments on hot plasmas means that weapons scientists rely heavily on modeling and calculation, but this must be validated by comparison to experiment where possible. This is why powerful lasers such as HELEN at AWE have been so important. However, these lasers must be powerful enough to access the high densities and temperatures of relevance in nuclear explosions and so new facilities are being built, for example ORION at AWE.
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CTBT METHODOLOGY
Nuclear weapons are highly complex systems, composed of many different materials, which are subjected to exceedingly high temperatures and densities. These materials may age in a way that could not be foreseen at the time of their design, or could become unavailable due to health and safety, manufacturing or supply problems. This means that it is not adequate to rely solely on previous nuclear tests as systems age or new designs come into service, however similar they are to the old ones. Nuclear weapons scientists must underwrite these systems without recourse to nuclear testing, and to do so they rely on the following strategy:
Comparison to archived test data Theory Algorithms Computation Performance predictions Hydrodynamic experiments Stockpile surveillance
Stockpile confidence
High-energy-density plasma experiments Primary Radiation flow Secondary
The theory is fed into elaborate computer models which are used to predict the performance of the nuclear weapon and provide confidence in the stockpile. As illustrated, each step in this strategy requires validation by comparison to the results of specialized experiments. Nuclear weapons states undertake surveillance of their stockpiles, in which warheads are withdrawn from service and subjected to forensic examination3 to check for problems of material compatibility and corrosion, as well as aging. Weapons laboratories must have extensive materials science programs to support this work.
CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, modern nuclear weapons are highly complex devices and future designs, with state-of-the-art security features,5 are likely to be even more so. Nuclear weapons scientists must underwrite both aging stockpiles and future systems, such as RRW, without nuclear testing and to do so they rely on a scientific methodology based on computer models,
5
Samuel W Bodman, Robert M Gates and Condoleezza Rice, "National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century," (July 2007).
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validated by comparison with experimental data. Although the database of previous nuclear tests forms an essential part of this methodology, it is not possible to rely on it in isolation. It is essential that nuclear weapons states maintain sufficient investment in the specialized facilities needed to support this certification process, and in the scientists whose technical expertise makes this work possible, in order to guarantee that their nuclear stockpiles can be maintained. Although other states believe that we can produce nuclear weapons because we have done so in the past, if we cannot convince ourselves that our weapons can be designed, assembled, stored and disassembled safely and securely, and that they will function correctly when required, then we will not be able to maintain a nuclear deterrent. The request for funding for the new RRW has been inexorably linked to nuclear weapons complex modernization. For the purposes of stockpile maintenance, it is essential that the latter goes ahead even if a new warhead is delayed or cancelled.
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Open Literature Publication and Nuclear Proliferation
THOMAS J.A. PLANT1
I N T RO D U C T I O N
The advancement of science and development of technology are to a very great extent dependent upon efficient information sharing between peers. The principal mechanism through which research results are disseminated and scientific knowledge advanced is through publication in peer-reviewed journals. The spread of reliable, high-speed Internet access has increased the popularity of electronic publication and generated an audience for eprint repositories such as arXiv. Combined with the ready availability of Internet search engines, the potential audience of research papers is massively increased over that of even 10 years ago. Hand in hand with the potential benefits of publication in open literature comes the danger that research undertaken for benign reasons could be used for malicious ends. This is acknowledged to be of particular relevance to Chemical and Biological (CB) defense, especially coupled with the dual-use nature of many CB precursors and production equipment. For example, publications in open source literature have revealed proteins that increase the virulence of smallpox,2 the genome of the bubonic plague bacteria3 and a method for synthesizing live poliovirus4 from basic chemical units. This paper argues, however, that the threat to nuclear and radiological defense is fundamentally different to the threat to CB defense, and therefore requires a different policy response.
?? British Crown Copyright 2007/MOD. Published with the permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty’s Stationery Office. The views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the Department or of HM Government 1 This paper was written whilst I was on placement in the Programme Support Office for the UK Nuclear Weapons Capability Sustainment Programme, as part of the Ministry of Defence Science and Engineering training scheme. I welcome any comments or questions from interested readers, and can be contacted via email at t.j.a.plant.00@cantab.net. I would like to acknowledge the contributions of my colleagues Guy Boulby, John Roberson and Mike Baker in testing, challenging and stimulating the ideas presented here.
Rosengard et al. 2002, “Variola Virus Immune Evasion Design: Expression of a Highly Efficient Inhibitor of Human Complement,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of America 99: 8808-8813 3 Julian Parkhill et al., “Genome sequence of Yersinia pestis: the causative agent of plague,” Nature 413 (August 2001): 523-527 4 Jeronimo Cello, Aniko Paul and Eckard Wimmer., “Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template” Science 297 (August 2002): 1016-1018
2
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The US, UK and partners must consider how to use open literature publication to maximize the pace of scientific development without increasing the nuclear threat from states of concern or other actors. This paper proposes a policy whereby unclassified publication in open literature by scientists engaged in research related to nuclear weapons can deliver improved benefits to defense science and technology without relaxing classification restrictions or adversely impacting the nuclear threat environment of the US, UK and partners.
COULD INFORMATION KILL US?
The presentation on which this paper is based was originally set against two of the PONI research topics for 2007, namely discussing the policy challenges facing the nuclear states and discussing how to address the proliferation and security threats from non-state actors. As it turned out, it was delivered in different panel sessions at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Strategic Command, Omaha (STRATCOM). Far from being a criticism of the conference organization, I prefer to think of open literature publication as a cross-cutting theme that simultaneously enables and threatens non-proliferation, and which therefore sits easily in either category. Regardless of its proper taxonomy, it is undeniable that the question of the extent to which open literature publication by nuclear scientists and engineers is appropriate is one that arouses strong feelings on both sides of the debate and has no simple answer. In 2001 Arthur Caplan, a bioethicist from the University of Pennsylvania, was quoted in the Los Angeles Times as saying: We have to get away from the ethos that knowledge is good, knowledge should be publicly available, that information will liberate us. . . Information will kill us in the techno-terrorist age, and I think it’s nuts to put that stuff on web sites.5 This much-quoted statement indicates the strength of feeling surrounding the debate on publication of information that could in some circumstances be used to threaten national security. Arthur Caplan refers principally to the fields of biology (particularly molecular biology) and chemistry, but the questions of ethics and threat in open source nuclear publication are equally valid.
5 Eric Lichtblau, “Response to Terror; Rising Fears That What We Do Know Can Hurt Us,” Los Angeles Times, November 18, 2001, A1
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Much of the work on this subject attempts to address the whole continuum of open literature publication, and moreover focuses strongly on molecular biology and chemistry rather than nuclear physics (an approach that is probably justified, for reasons that will become obvious later). The “workshop” approach to policy making appears to be strongly favored, and has in one notable case relating to the potential threat from publishing fundamental research into recombinant DNA lead to the production of guidelines for those engaged in such research.6 As an aside it is worth noting that the fact that these guidelines are now widely accepted is testament to the efficacy of engagement of the whole spectrum of the community by policymakers, from intelligence and security experts to the most liberal of scientists. Despite the successes and high profile of discussions in the biological and chemical world, the majority of high profile discussions of this issue in the nuclear world are focused on issues of classification and information security. It seems to me that an issue of fundamental importance, the publication of unclassified but potentially threatening material by defense nuclear scientists has not been adequately addressed in these discussions, or if it has then it has been conflated with the debate surrounding declassification of information. When I began to examine this problem I intended to examine the positive and negative impacts of publication in open literature by institutions and scientists engaged in nuclear weapons research, and to suggest a way forward to maximize the benefits of such publication while minimizing any increased nuclear proliferation threat. During my research I discovered that the issue as a whole was so complex and contentious as to be almost intractable; however, by focusing on a sub-element of the problem I believe that I have arrived at a practicable response to this particular policy challenge, albeit in a reduced context. Therefore the following arguments are confined to the issues surrounding unclassified publication by nuclear defense scientists, and do not seek to examine or influence where the classification boundaries should be drawn.
THE BENEFITS OF OPEN LITERATURE PUBLICATION
It is considered axiomatic amongst the majority of the scientific community that publication of research in the open literature is beneficial in some way, for various reasons; to science as a whole, to the reputation of the publication or institution in question or perhaps even for reasons of personal advancement. An exception to this rule is the defense science community, which generally accepts, with varying degrees of reluctance, that some of their work may not be appropriate for publication due to the possibility that actors hostile to their
6
Paul Berg, David Baltimore, Sydney Brenner, Richard O. Roblin III, and Maxine F. Singer, “Summary Statement of the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 72: 1981-1984
37
nation may benefit from an increased military capability as a result of the knowledge transferred. The potential for increased threat is discussed in the section below, while this section discusses the model of research and publication that has become the norm for the sciences, and the reasons for its pre-eminence. Up to this point I have not challenged the assumption that open literature publication leads to benefits to science as a whole, or indeed the implicit assumption that benefits to science as a whole are inherently good, or beneficial to wider society at the national and even international levels. I believe that it is relatively simple to argue the first point, but considerably more difficult to reach a definite conclusion on the second. To take a pertinent example, the research under the banner of the Manhattan Project undoubtedly increased the sum total of human knowledge, but the question of whether the advent of the nuclear era has benefited society as a whole at an international level is far less clear cut. Taking aside the moral and social implications touched on above, and considering only the advancement of scientific knowledge as a metric, we can see that the reason why publication in open literature has become the dominant method of communication for those engaged in scientific research is because it is effective. Open publication of research can result in advancement of science in a number of ways: there is no need to perform experiments and complex calculations yourself if the results have already been obtained and published by another (unless you specifically want to check their results), and therefore the pace of research overall is accelerated due to the more efficient direction of resource; it is simple to identify those working in your field with whom you may wish to collaborate by simply examining the list of authors and institutions associated with a publication that is of interest to you, thereby leading to further efficiencies of effort and knowledge sharing; collaboration as a result of this identification (particularly between the defense and civil spheres) can lead to more effective technology transfer and exploitation, which may have benefits extending beyond science. This last point is a particularly hot topic in UK defense research and development at present. In the foreword to the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) Defence Technology Strategy (DTS), Lord Drayson, then the Minister for Defence Procurement stated: The civil sector is increasingly becoming a significant source of science and technology; we must access this, grasp the opportunities it presents and adapt them quickly and effectively into defense benefit. Equally we must look to exploit those opportunities to transfer defense technologies into the civil sector. 7
Ministry of Defence publication 2006. Defence Technology Strategy http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/ScienceandTechnolo gyPublications/SITDocuments/DefenceTechnologyStrategy2006.htm
7UK
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At a Department of Energy (DOE) workshop in November 1999, A. Bryan Siebert (Director of the Office of Nuclear and National Security Information at the DOE) argued that a certain level of openness by the defense science community actually supports a number of positive aims in addition to scientific research in general, citing treaty verification and non-proliferation as examples, and strongly advocated the adoption of similar policies by other countries.8 An interesting point along similar lines that was raised at the LANL PONI conference related to the utility of open literature publication in delivering an element of the credibility of a nation’s nuclear deterrent; in broad terms, the better one’s science, the more likely one’s deterrent will function when required. A final point to note, which relates solely to the benefits of open literature publication by defense scientists, is that a certain amount of open literature publication by defense scientists and engineers is almost essential to ensure job satisfaction. Because of the norms associated with a scientific career by the majority of the (non-defense) science community, it is important to allow defense scientists to build unclassified curriculum vitae of sufficient quality to allow them a reasonable level of flexibility in their future career. Without any publications to one’s name in the unclassified world it would be more challenging than perhaps is necessary to find posts that would advance one’s career following an extended stint in the largely classified world of defense (and particularly nuclear) science. Given the fluidity of today’s job market and the reduced likelihood that one job is for life, to preclude the possibility of open publications by defense scientists, albeit to a limited extent, would be likely to reduce the pool of potential employees to an unsustainably low level.
ASSESSING THE RISKS
Unfortunately the benefits associated with open literature publication listed above do have some associated risks, which make the assessment of the correct policy more complex. For example, despite the restrictions of a classification regime it is possible that a publication passed as unclassified may contain information that is useful to those actors hostile to the nation from which the information originates. It is difficult to tell, for example, which technologies and areas of science those hostile to you are interested in, and the first benefit given above (the ability to rely to some extent on the work of others) cuts both ways in this regard. No matter the restrictions on information content, every open literature publication results in a transfer of information at some level. Indeed, the US government itself has begun to expand its use of open source intelligence (OSINT, which can be distinguished from open source information by the addition of contextual analysis), and in November
8
Jennifer Weeks, ed., “Secrecy versus Openness: Finding a Balance at the Department of Energy,” Proceedings of a Workshop held November 29, 1999, (Harvard University 2000).
39
2005 opened the Open Source Center (OSC) under the management of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In early 2007 CIA Director Michael Hayden testified to Congress that: [The managers of the US intelligence community] recognize [the OSC’s] unique and growing contributions to integrated collection and analysis.9 Given the increasing emphasis placed on OSINT by US, it is reasonable to assume that those hostile to the US (and UK for that matter) are similarly alert to the possibilities inherent in applying modern data-mining methods to open source information, including scientific information. An interesting aspect of the process of converting information to intelligence is the application of the so-called mosaic principle, or jigsaw puzzle metaphor. The premise is that a number of pieces of unclassified information relating to the same or similar entities, events or ideas (technologies for example) can be used to cross-correlate each other and provide the necessary context for further information to be used as intelligence. Just as in a mosaic, where possession of a tile tells you nothing but its color, but knowledge of its position in relation to other tiles in a greater whole will give an increasingly accurate picture of that whole as more tiles are collected, so the same can apply in analysis of open source information. It is conceivable that analysis of a sufficient quantity of PONI papers and presentations coupled with the (readily obtainable) knowledge of the social context and organizational relationships between participants could yield a reasonable estimate of the likely progression of nuclear policymaking by the US and the UK over the short term, and also the personality and natural inclinations of those junior participants who ultimately arrive in high office! A further complication to the mosaic principle is that analysis of areas not discussed can yield a picture of the classification boundaries drawn by an organization or nation, and therefore an assessment can be made of those areas of particular interest to the organization or nation in question. Finally, publication in the open literature by a defense nuclear scientist identifies that scientist as a potential target for hostile intelligence agencies or other groups. This could take the form of risk to personal security (along the lines of attacks by radical pro-life groups and individuals on medical practitioners known to conduct abortions, or similar persecution of scientists that experiment on animals), but it is more likely, depending of the predilections of the agency or group in question, that a person so identified would be assessed as a potential target for subversion, for example by financial inducement or blackmail. The Threat from Information Transfer
9FEATURE:
US embraces open source intelligence. Jane’s Intelligence Digest (April 13, 2007).
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Given the arguments above, it is evident that it is desirable to exploit the benefits of open literature publication, but also that to do so without restraint could severely impact the security of the US, UK and partners, even without crossing classification boundaries. In order to assess the principal risk, that of transfer of unwanted information, I have used the construct in Figure 1.
THREAT
CAPABILITY
INTENT
MATERI??L
ABILITY
INFRASTRUCTURE
Figure 1: The Threat Tree
MATERIALS
PERSONNEL
INFORMATION
The top two levels are based on the canonical model that deterrence equals credibility plus will. In the threat context, credibility is loosely mapped to capability, while will is mapped to intent; thus the threat of action by a hostile party is directly governed by the capability of that party to carry out the action, coupled with its will to do so. The “intent” arm of the tree is not considered further here. “Capability” in this model is considered to comprise “Materiel” and “Ability”; “Materiel” can be considered as all of the physical aspects of capability and in turn comprises “[raw] Materials” and the “Infrastructure” required to convert those materials into the physical aspects of a capability, while “Ability” can be thought of as the soft system aspects of a capability (and in the nuclear context includes the ability to weaponize a working nuclear device), which are broken down here into “Personnel” having suitable qualifications and experience, and the “Information” or knowledge base they require to fulfill their function. For example, if both “Personnel” and “Information” pertaining to a particular weapon system are available to an actor, then they can be considered to have “Ability” to create and use that system; however, if “Personnel” are not available then regardless of the availability of “Information”, the actor will not fulfill the “Ability” criterion, and therefore does not have the “Capability” to threaten another actor with that weapon system. In order to illustrate this, and incidentally explain why the focus in the debate on open literature
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publication so frequently focuses on the chemical and biological field, consider the following case study. Case Study 1: Manufacture of Biological or Chemical Agent The infrastructure requirements for manufacturing biological or chemical agents are relatively low technology, with the scale of the necessary facilities dictated by the volume and rate of production of agent required. In order to synthesize small quantities of biological or chemical agents, nothing more than a university level laboratory is required. In the case of some agents, it is even possible to assemble the appropriate infrastructure in a private home. For example, Dr. Donna Seger, president of the American Academy of Clinical Toxicology was quoted in 2004 as saying of the toxin ricin, “It is easy to make. You can do it in your kitchen from castor beans.”10 The above statement also indicates the ready availability of the appropriate materials. Although ricin is an unlikely weapon for those seeking to cause mass casualties, many other agents, particularly chemical agents, have similarly accessible infrastructure and basic material requirements. It is likely that at most an undergraduate chemistry or biochemistry education would be required to synthesize an agent, although it is arguable whether or not this level of experience would be sufficient to produce a weaponized form. Clearly all of the elements necessary for production of an agent on a small scale, perhaps for an attack by a non-state actor, are available to the large segment of the population who have the necessary expertise. The final piece of the puzzle is the necessary information; as mentioned above, there are many publications in the open literature relevant to this kind of threat that could be of use to those who seek to harm the US, UK and partners.2, 3, 4 Given the implications of this case study, it is obvious that significant effort must be concentrated on the control of sensitive but unclassified information by policymakers. However, is the same true in the nuclear world? There are two broad classes of nuclear threat to consider, that of a basic nuclear device and that of an advanced or mass-produced device. Notice the use of the term “device” rather than “weapon”, indicating that the threat may be non-military. A basic nuclear device is considered to be any device that uses a quantity of fissionable material in a super-critical configuration to release a large amount of energy when fired. An advanced device would develop the efficiency of the energy release from the fissionable material by a number of methods, and could even exploit thermonuclear fusion. Mass-produced devices have additional constraints on the safety and repeatability of manufacturing process. Radiological dispersal devices, or dirty bombs, are not considered here.
10
Fox News online 2004. Ricin Easy To Make, Very Poisonous. February 3. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,110337,00.html accessed January 8, 2008
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Case Study 2: Production of a Basic Nuclear Device The infrastructure required in this case is a step up from the biological or chemical agent case. Even so, one could envisage a simple gun assembly device11 being assembled in a large laboratory, or perhaps a warehouse fitted with appropriate (relatively) basic engineering equipment. Again, the personnel requirements are somewhat greater than in the previous case study, with graduate expertise required in a number of areas such as metallurgy, explosives, physics, engineering and so forth. Although the population of such people is smaller than in the above case, there are still a significant number of people with the appropriate skill level. The material requirement, however, are considerably more challenging; the critical mass for a sphere of uranium-235 at normal density is quoted by various sources as approximately 50 kilograms12 (corresponding to a sphere of radius approximately 18cm), and although technical measures can be taken to reduce this mass it is unlikely that such a quantity of material could be assembled with ease or without arousing suspicion amongst the responsible nuclear community. Appropriate enrichment of the fissionable material is a further technical challenge that, if not overcome, would dramatically increase the quantity of material required for a functioning nuclear device. In contrast, the information required to manufacture such a device is, I believe, already present in the open literature. The starting point for the majority of nuclear weapon designers at Los Alamos National Laboratory during the Manhattan Project was a series of five lectures given by the theoretician Robert Serber in 1943, and which are now available in the open literature.13 These lectures are notable for their reliance on simple physics and order of magnitude calculations; therefore one could assume that if recent science and engineering graduates and post-graduates could design and build a working nuclear weapon in two years based on this material, then the same would be possible (albeit perhaps in a longer period of time) for a small group of similarly qualified people in the present. It is interesting to note that the original transcriptions of the Serber lectures are also available on the internet; originally declassified following the first Chinese nuclear test in 1965, these were subsequently
11 A gun assembly device uses one or more explosive charges to drive two subcritical masses of fissionable material into one another, forming a super-critical configuration and resulting in a nuclear yield. The “Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was a gun assembly device using uranium-235 as the fissionable material. 12 Committee to Provide Interim Oversight of the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, National Research Council, The Nuclear Weapons Complex: Management for Health, Safety, and the Environment. (Washington DC: National Academy, 1989.) 13 Robert Serber, The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures on How To Build An Atomic Bomb. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992).
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reclassified following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US, but are still available on various internet mirror sites.14 Case Study 3: Production of Advanced Nuclear Devices The infrastructure requirements to produce one or more advanced or mass-produced devices are evidently tremendous. To consider the UK and US nuclear weapons programs for example, multiple facilities across many different sites are required and the cost of maintaining such an infrastructure is vast. In a recent answer to a written Parliamentary Question, Secretary of State for Defence Des Brown gave the forecast costs of the UK Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme for the next three years as approximately ??2.65bn,15 or $5.2bn, while the US program is larger still. The material requirements for such a device are similarly stretching; in addition to the difficulties of acquiring a significant quantity of sufficiently enriched fissile material, many of the technical solutions to increasing fission efficiency (and certainly exploiting thermonuclear fusion) are dependent upon access to a number of more esoteric materials that are variously harder to come by and more difficult to handle and work with. It is no longer sufficient for the personnel performing the science and engineering design work to be graduates or postgraduates; a core of world class scientists and engineers is required, in addition to personnel that are “merely” expert. The information required to produce an advanced device is certainly not in the public domain (though certain information relevant to mass-production such as bulk handling requirements may be), as this knowledge is typically covered by information security controls. The only way to access such a knowledge base would be to build it up over a long period, as the current nuclear weapon states have done, which without access to nuclear test results would be extremely challenging. This would also almost certainly increase the infrastructure requirements in order that the underpinning scientific principles of the relevant physical processes could be investigated in the absence of testing.
DISCUSSION
An Increased Threat from Information Transfer? The last two case studies above allow us to make the following observations:
For example http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/docs1/00349710.pdf (accessed 14 December 2007) 15 House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 11 Dec 2007 (pt 0012) Column 400W. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm071211/text/71211w0012.htm#0712122 2004267 (accessed 16 December 2007)
14
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1. The principal difficulties to be overcome by an actor seeking to produce a basic nuclear device lie in the realm of material acquisition, specifically acquisition (and enrichment if necessary) of fissile material. 2. The barriers to non-state production of an advanced nuclear device are so high as to be currently insurmountable. Therefore we can draw the conclusion that non-state actors are not assisted, in terms of information transfer, by unclassified publications by defense nuclear scientists in the open literature. In the case of the basic device, the information is already in the literature and the principal barriers relate to acquisition of material; in the case of the advanced device, the second observation above leads us to conclude that there is no additional threat in this regard either. State actors that are not already nuclear weapon states are also principally barred from proliferating by material controls, but given the resources of a state-level actor once this barrier is crossed it is a matter of time until a nuclear device or devices can be produced. A nuclear weapon (as distinct from a device) is another, more technically challenging, matter, though it is likely that this refinement would simply add more time to the development period rather than rendering such development impossible. State actors that are already nuclear weapon states could be assisted to a limited extent by publications in the open literature, as it is likely that such literature could provide useful cross-checks on fundamental research carried out in-house. However, the detailed work necessary to refine an advanced design would not be assisted by these publications. The Intelligence Dimension I have not examined in detail the intelligence threat posed by open literature publication, citing only briefly two potential possibilities: exploitation of the mosaic principle, and the potential targeting of defense nuclear scientists by hostile intelligence agencies or non-state groups. Effective use of the mosaic principle requires a large coordinated intelligence effort that is likely to be beyond the reach of non-state actors (although large well-funded networks such as Al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo could be argued to be exceptions to this rule), and given the large effort required for a relatively small gain in the national defense context even state actors may choose to direct their efforts elsewhere. The risk to personal security of publishing scientists and engineers is dynamic, and depends on a number of factors such as public opinion on nuclear weapon ownership, the prevalence of radical anti-nuclear groups and the threat at any given time from hostile state intelligence agencies. The response to this lies within the domain of the counter-espionage and security services, but any policy on unclassified open literature publication that affects the necessary actions to be taken by these services should include adequate provision to fund the appropriate changes. It is of course
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possible that increased openness could reduce the threat environment as part of a wider policy of engagement and de-radicalization of potentially hostile parties. Social Norms of the Scientific Community Of the reasons to consider open literature publication beneficial cited previously, only one, the benefit of science as a whole, is a primary driver. Enhancements to reputation of publications, institutions, individuals and so forth result from the perceived advancement to science associated with a given publication. As the culture of publication becomes dominant it is inevitable that a set of social rules will develop that govern this community, and that adherence to these rules will gradually replace, to some extent, the original reasoning behind publication. For example, in many scientific publications with multiple authors it is traditional that the principal researcher for the paper will be the first author named at the heading of the paper and in subsequent citations. Less obviously, in situations where research is conducted under the aegis of a senior scientist (for example within their research group), but where this senior scientist is not the principal researcher (who could, for example, be a supervisee), I have seen instances where that person has requested to be the last named author in the paper. These social rules have developed to the point where they are norms, and where they are divorced for the primary publication driver. This could lead us to suspect that even if the primary reasoning for allowing unclassified publication by defense nuclear scientists in the open literature is compelling, the other reasons, which are ultimately social in nature, should perhaps be treated as a separate issue. This suggests that some thought could be given to a way of developing an equivalent currency of credibility for defense nuclear scientists that would enable them to be acknowledged by their peers without the requirement for publication in open literature (although publication would still continue for the reasons discussed earlier).
C O N C L U S I O N S A N D R E C O M M E N DA T I O N S
Given the minimal or potentially non-existent increase to the threat environment as a result of information transfer to hostile parties from open literature publication coupled with the benefits of such publication discussed previously, it would seem logical to exploit these benefits by increasing the amount of open literature publication by defense nuclear scientists. In order to do this without altering the classification regime, the principal defense against unwanted information transfer, one way to achieve this would be to increase the participation of defense nuclear scientists in unclassified research. Of particular interest is 46
secondment to non-defense work, as this elicits a number of the benefits discussed above for society in general and defense in particular (when considering issues of human capability and identification of collaboration and technology transfer opportunities for example) without the risk of unwanted information transfer. Similarly I advocate a broadening of the use of nuclear research facilities to allow academic access to the non-defense community. As above, this will enable collaboration, technology transfer and demonstration of capability, and additionally could enhance the perception of the nuclear science community amongst non-defense scientists and the general public. Of course both this suggestion and that in the previous paragraph will require additional funding; in order to continue with the same tempo of research in areas specifically related to defense nuclear science objectives while allowing wider use of facilities and allowing scientists to perform a greater proportion of non-core research will require more facilities (or greater availability of existing facilities) and a larger pool of scientists and engineers in the defense nuclear community. As the benefits of such an approach would be realized across society rather than just within defense, it is reasonable to propose that this policy should be implemented as part of a crossgovernmental approach to research and development. For example, in 2004 the then UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, now the Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, DBERR) published the UK Science & Innovation Investment Framework,16 which recommended as a key conclusion that the government should endeavor to stimulate spending on research and development across the UK to the level of 2.5% gross domestic product by 2014, up from 1.9% in 2004. This increase of over 30% in research and development investment could allow the policies suggested above to become reality, and the proposed creation of a Large Facilities Council for large infrastructure projects could deliver the strategic level co-ordination and integration required to make this aspect of the policy work. A final point, and one that is perhaps worthy of exploration in future work, relates to the discussion above on social norms within the scientific community. Given the not-quiteinformal currency of publications and citations that is used amongst the wider scientific community to assess the relative quality or worth of its members, and the inability of defense nuclear scientists to compete on a level playing field in these terms with their contemporaries, it is possible that some equivalent measure could be generated for use by defense nuclear scientists. This could take the form of independent review of in-house classified journals by a panel scientists and engineers from outside the nuclear complex, with independence and credibility assured by allowing the members of this peer review panel to
16
HM Treasury Web Site: Spending Review 2004: Science and Innovation. http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spend_sr04/associated_documents/spending_sr04_science.cfm (accessed 9 January 2008)
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be selected by members of the wider nuclear community. In this way it would be possible for defense nuclear scientists to build up a credible portfolio of publications without revealing the details of their work to the wider community.
E N D N OT E
I believe that, given the demographics of the nuclear science and engineering community, it is vital that consideration is given to exercising and developing the capability of junior staff, and to developing their motivation. If action of this kind is not taken at national strategic level, both the US and the UK risk the death of their nuclear weapons capabilities through atrophy. Regardless of whether the policies advocated above are taken forward, serious thought should be given to this pressing issue. The arms race of the twenty-first century is intellectual, and it is vital for the US, UK and partners to stay in the lead
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Responding to a Nuclear 9/11
FRANCIS SLAKEY1
THE POSSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR 9/11
More than 40 countries have weapons-usable nuclear material. To restrict terrorists from acquiring the material, there are numerous Federal and global programs in place that encompass prevention, detection and interdiction (PDI): Prevention There is an extensive multi-billion dollar a year prevention program that extends over 4 continents and more than 30 countries and constitutes a rigorous complex involving, among other things, guns, guards and gates at facilities that have nuclear material. Detection There is an extensive detection program, with growing world wide participation. It is made up of a global partnership (Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Megaports Initiative) to deploy radiation detection technology plus an R&D program to advance current technology and develop new techniques. Interdiction There is a global interdiction program, the Proliferation Security Initiative, with more than 70 participating countries aimed at stopping shipments of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials. Weaknesses in the PDI programs Is it really possible that all three of these lines of defense (prevention, detection and interdiction) could fail? The short answer is: yes. In fact, the prevention program has, to an extent, already been known to fail. While in most cases nuclear material is under very tight control, even the most diligent security plans and storage protocols can be breached. Between 1993 and 2004 there were 611 confirmed cases of smuggling of nuclear and radiological material. Fortunately, none of the smuggling cases alone involved quantities that presented a substantial risk.
1
Francis Slakey is the Upjohn Professor of Physics & Biology at Georgetown University.
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Further, the detection program is not foolproof. For example, low energy gamma rays emitted from U-235 can be easily shielded from radiation detectors. In addition, less than 2 percent of all containers coming through the nation’s ports are inspected. Consequently, the detection line of defense is rather thin. Given such weaknesses, the threat of nuclear terrorism on US soil is real. In fact, several experts expect nuclear terrorism to occur sometime within the next 10 years.
THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS
The goal of a nuclear forensics program is to provide national leadership with as much analytical information about a detonation as soon as possible, and with as much accuracy as possible. In combination with additional information (e.g. intelligence and law enforcement sources), an assessment can then be made about where the material may have come from and which country or non-regional actors might be responsible. A nuclear terrorist detonation establishes a crime scene. However, not surprisingly, the scene is atypical. There won’t be an axle with a serial number, or fingerprints, or hair samples, or fabrics to examine at the scene. All of those clues will literally have been vaporized in the explosion. Nevertheless, there will be a substantial clue left behind: radiation. Using mass spectrometers, electron microscopes, and x-ray diffraction, among other investigative tools, information can be gathered about the detonation including yield, type of nuclear material, amount of nuclear material, and the time since the nuclear material was removed from the fuel cycle. Combining that information with a reverse engineering of weapons codes can then elucidate additional characteristics of the nuclear device such as shape, weight, and design. If there exists a database of matching samples, then the material can potentially be traced back to its original source reactor. Unfortunately, most of this information can take considerable time to acquire, limited primarily by the decay characteristics of the radioactive material. To illustrate the role of nuclear forensics in an investigation,2 consider the following possible sequence of events that might follow a terrorist detonation of a nuclear weapon on US soil:
2
The scenario is limited to the four weeks that follow the detonation and illustrates the capability of nuclear forensics as it existed on September 11, 2001. The reason for the one-month time frame is that was roughly the time between when the Twin Towers were hit and when our response began in Afghanistan.
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Seismic sensors detect a detonation. Within one hour, seismologists review the data and estimate that it is a 20kT explosion. The President announces that the Director of the National Security Council will be managing the day to day operations of the investigation. The FBI is identified as the lead agency handling the site. A plane is dispatched to collect air samples. Ground teams are dispatched to do on-site sample collection. The samples are sent to Oak Ridge and Los Alamos National Labs for analysis. The NSC Director contacts the Directors of Oakridge lab, Los Alamos lab, the CIA and the FBI and informs them that the President expects their best comprehensive assessment within four weeks. The two labs now task all their available radiochemistry personnel to work 12 hour shifts prepping and analyzing the incoming samples. Based on the excess radiation beyond normal background, it is unambiguously confirmed that the detonation was nuclear. Also, based on preliminary analysis of the air samples, the device is identified as uranium-based, not plutonium-based. The NSC Director, recognizing a need for broad acceptance of the attribution analysis, instructs the labs to include international participation in the analysis. The technical director of the IAEA embarks for the US to join in the analysis. The State Department contacts China, Russia, the UK, and France to determine their level of cooperation. Oak Ridge completes some preliminary gamma-ray spectrometry of bulk samples and can now confidently identify the signature as consistent with a rudimentary guntype uranium device. They alert the CIA that the material is not a stolen nuclear weapon from an existing arsenal. The State Department reaches agreements with France and the UK to have their leading radiochemists dispatched to the US labs carrying out the analysis. The Labs are beginning to perform chemical separations to isolate individual elements. At this stage, all isotopic ratios have large error bars, plus/minus 60%, so no conclusions can as yet be drawn about the source. Two weeks have now gone by.
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The labs complete the initial chemical separations and are now starting highresolution spectrometry. Speed is limited by personnel and the decay rates of the isotopes. The NSC Director demands a faster response and the labs now put their personnel on 16 hour shifts. Enough data has now been collected that the labs can begin reverse engineering the weapons codes in order to determine the burn characteristics of the source reactor and when the material was removed from the nuclear fuel cycle. Three weeks have gone by since the detonation. The preliminary analysis of burn characteristics indicates that it is highly unlikely that the material originated in the US, France or the UK. The labs explain that there is a possibility that they can trace the source back to the original reactor, but that can only happen quickly with either detailed reactor design information or spent fuel data. Two days remain until the deadline. The FBI investigation and CIA sources are beginning to reveal pathways for how the material got into the United States. The NSC Director demands a faster response from the labs. The President of Iran holds a press conference announcing that he does not trust the US to carry out the analysis. He demands to have samples so Iran can carry out its own analysis. Russia and China are reluctant to provide their databases without having more involvement in the investigation. They reiterate that if the US provides debris samples they will carry out analysis of their own. For the 28th straight day, this issue of sample sharing goes unresolved. The fourth week ends and the NSC Director contacts the labs and asks for a comprehensive assessment. The labs report the following: 1) the data indicate the device was very likely a 60 kilogram gun-like mechanism with an efficiency of less than 3%; 2) the material did not come from the US, France, or the UK; 3) at this point in the investigation, based on the error bars on the isotopic ratios and therefore the incomplete knowledge of the fission history, the labs cannot exclude a Russian or Pakistani reactor, also there is a 30% possibility that it was burned in a Chinese reactor or a North Korean reactor. The following chart condenses the above scenario:
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N U C L E A R F O R E N S I C A C T I V I T I E S F O L L OW I N G A T E R R O R I S T E X P L O S I O N
Action Determination that detonation is nuclear
Timescale Less than an hour
Methods and limitations Determined from yield (seismic magnitude), optical signature and presence of excess radiation above normal background (due to neutron activation and presence of fallout). Rapid classification as unambiguously nuclear can be more challenging for low yields (sub-kiloton). Limited by time needed to collect sample, bring to laboratory and prepare for adequate analysis.
Identification of fuel type and sophistication of device, and initial assessment of isotopic signatures Complete characterization of chemical and physical signature Attribution and assessment of further threat
Hours to weeks
1 to 2 weeks Hours to years
Limited by decay rates of isotopes and by need for multiple high-resolution analyses. Limited by availability of relevant data bank
NUCLEAR FORENSICS CHALLENGES
The above scenario was meant to be illustrative, not rigorously accurate. In fact, it illustrates the nuclear forensics capability as it existed in 2001 and there have been numerous improvements since then. Nevertheless, the scenario does indicate three major challenges associated with nuclear forensics, all of which are still present today. Technical Infrastructure There is a limited group of skilled personnel available to carry out the nuclear forensics investigation. In particular, the lack of nuclear chemists is a key limiting factor on the forensics capability. In addition, there is a highly limited field analysis capability. As the scenario illustrates, samples were sent to the national labs for analysis. Lastly, there is an extremely limited sample-matching database that is currently available. The result of this limited technical infrastructure is that there is currently a severe constraint on the ability of nuclear forensics to deliver accurate results on the necessary rapid timescale. Validation The scenario illustrates a need to establish international participation in the analysis to insure widespread acceptance of the results. Expectation management 53
It is certainly possible that from the perspective of political leadership, one month is a substantial period of time to inform a response. After all, the bombing of Afghanistan began less than a month after September 11th. From a scientific perspective however, one month may not be sufficient time to make a robust nuclear forensics assessment. Consequently, the political leadership must be appropriately prepared for the capabilities and limitations of nuclear forensics.
I M P ROV E M E N T S TO T H E N U C L E A R F O R E N S I C S C A PA B I L I T Y
The three limitations identified above (technical infrastructure, validation, and expectation management) could all be addressed through a Federal Nuclear Forensics Infrastructure Initiative. Such an initiative should have two goals: 1) create a sustainable, enduring national nuclear forensics capability; and 2) reduce the time for forensics analysis by a factor of 2 within 5 years and a factor of 3 within 10 years. In particular, an effective Initiative would have several components: R&D for a Better Field Diagnostic Capability A program to upgrade equipment at the DOE and other involved laboratories to world standards should be undertaken. A program should also be undertaken to develop and manufacture field equipment that would allow the necessary measurements to be made rapidly and accurately at a number of sites in the event of a nuclear detonation. Workforce Development A program to refill the pipeline of trained personnel should be undertaken. The program would require funding research at universities in cooperation with the relevant laboratories, funding graduate scholarships and fellowships, and funding internships at the laboratories. Sample Database development The U.S. government should extend its initiatives and leadership to counter WMD terrorism to include provision for prompt technical and operational cooperation in the event of a nuclear detonation anywhere in the world, including an extended, accessible, properly safeguarded database. Nuclear intercepts and even more a nuclear detonation are inherently international: the materials and people come from abroad, analyses and interpretations are made worldwide, and the audience and the consequences will also be worldwide. The Global Initiative may be a vehicle for such cooperation. Review Panel
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The U.S. government at a suitably high level should cause two kinds of review and evaluation groups to be established. One would review and evaluate on a real-time basis. The other would advise decision makers following a detonation or an intercept of nuclear material regarding what was known, how confidently it was known, and what was still not known. The panel should have international participation. Exercises The existing programs to exercise U.S. capability against terrorist events, such as the Topoff exercises and others, should be reviewed for their adequacy at testing what actions, coordination, communication and policies would be needed at all levels in the event of a nuclear detonation, especially one of unknown origin, anywhere in the world. The U.S. will find itself deeply involved at the political, humanitarian, military, law enforcement and technical levels wherever a nuclear detonation occurs.
B E YO N D A T T R I BU T I O N
The scenario outlined in this paper focused on a nuclear detonation and the ability to inform a response. Of course, the hope is that the prevention/detection/interdiction programs are successful and such a scenario is prevented. Indeed, in the case of interdiction, the seized nuclear material is intact and nuclear forensics may offer a substantial investigative capability. While nuclear forensics certainly contributes to the attribution process, there are two additional contributions that nuclear forensics can make to national security: 1. nuclear forensics analysis may provide details such as yield, shape, size, and design that can contribute to tracking similar weapons that might be used in an attempted future attack; and, 2. nuclear forensics analysis may provide information on how the current prevention/detection/interdiction programs broke down, thereby leading to improvements in those programs. Consequently, improving our nation’s nuclear forensics capability will not only enhance the post-detonation attribution methods, it will greatly improve the ability to track nuclear material and improve complementary programs to prevent, detect and interdict nuclear terrorism.
This paper is based in part on a report on Nuclear Forensics sponsored by the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
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Nuclear Forensics: How Strong is the New Foundation of Nuclear Deterrence?
MATTHEW ALLEN3
ABSTRACT
Technical nuclear forensics has been touted as the new foundation of nuclear deterrence. A credible attribution program could dissuade nation states from assisting terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons and materials. A credible nuclear forensics program must include three main components (1) acquisition of samples, (2) analysis of samples by experienced experts, and (3) comparison of those samples to known signatures. This paper discusses urgent challenges associated with each of those components of the United States Government technical nuclear forensics program. A brief overview of the United States Government inter-agency program is also given.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
The successful detonation of a nuclear device in a major urban area (either within the US or abroad) would be catastrophic. Even though the probability of such an event may be low, the consequences are so extreme that the risk associated with nuclear terrorism is perceived as high. During the Cold War the United States relied on its vast nuclear arsenal and the threat of retaliation to deter its adversaries from using nuclear weapons against it or its allies. In the post-Cold War era (or post-9/11 era whichever name one prefers) the risk associated with nuclear weapons has fundamentally changed. We now fear nuclear terrorism far more than a massive exchange of nuclear missiles, which dramatically alters the calculus of deterrence. The lack of a return address and no apparent concern for self-preservation makes terrorist organizations difficult if not impossible to deter. Fortunately, nuclear materials of the type required for a nuclear weapon are still too difficult for a terrorist organization to develop without significant resources and expertise. Therefore, terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon or the material required for such a weapon must involve state assistance at some level. This assistance could take the form of either direct
3
Matthew Allen is a Senior Member of Technical Staff at Sandia National Laboratories. He is currently serving as a Congressional Fellow at the Committee on Homeland Security in the House of Representatives. The views of Matthew Allen do not necessarily reflect the views of any Member or Committee of Congress. (email:matthew.allen@mail.house.gov)
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assistance – in which a state consciously supplies terrorists with a weapon or the necessary material – or indirect assistance – in which security negligence allows a terrorist organization to steal a weapon or nuclear material. The field of nuclear forensics has recently captured the attention of scientists, academics, policy analysts, and law makers as a possible means of preventing nuclear terrorism by deterring state-actors that may equip terrorist organizations with nuclear weapons or materials.4 Despite its recent attention as an emerging field, the field of technical nuclear forensics is not new. The field has its origins (like many nuclear fields) in the early days of the Manhattan project. Laboratory techniques similar to present day activities were used in 1949 to confirm the U.S.S.R’s first demonstration of a nuclear weapon. What is new is the role of nuclear forensics in supporting attribution. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s, people began to worry about “loose nukes” and the availability of fissile material. In 1996, the FBI established the Weapons of Mass Destruction response/forensics program. In 2000, the Department of Defense initiated the Domestic Nuclear Event Attribution Program, a program aimed specifically at attribution of nuclear events that may occur within the United States. The current U.S. Government (USG) attribution program is coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security and is discussed below. It is critical to understand that technical nuclear forensics does not equate to attribution. In essence, attribution of a nuclear terrorist attack to the responsible individual or organization will be a combination of technical nuclear forensics, intelligence, and investigation. It is the holistic view provided by these three disciplines of information that are necessary for credible attribution. While technical forensics may be able to identify the origin of the material and design of the weapon -- a process known as source attribution – it is only one piece of the puzzle. Intelligence and good-old-fashioned investigation would almost certainly be necessary to answer questions associated with route attribution, namely, how did it get there and who was involved? The goal of this paper is to qualitatively discuss a critical factor in the deterrence equation for nuclear terrorism: the sustainability of America’s technical nuclear forensics capabilities. For nuclear terrorism to be effectively deterred, an administration policy on attribution is necessary, and for such a policy to be effective, attribution capabilities must be credible.
Michael Miller, “Nuclear Attribution as Deterrence,” Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 1 (March 2007): 33-59 and the references therein: Caitlin Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11,” The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 21-34; William Dunlop and Harold Smith, “Who Did it? Using International Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism,” Arms Control Today 36, no. 8 (October 2006); Sen. Joe Biden,“CSI: Nukes,” Wall Street Journal (June 4, 2007): A17
4
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However, technical nuclear forensics – much like other nuclear fields in the United States – has been in a state of decline over the last several decades. Many of the required aspects of a nuclear forensics program such as sample acquisition technology, laboratory infrastructure, and human capitol have been steadily declining since the height of the Cold War. The WC-135 (a plane used to acquire atmospheric samples) has gone from a fleet of planes during the Cold War down to one in the new century. Operations across the DOE laboratory complex have been scaled back at many locations due to cost, and most of the radiochemists at the national labs – many of whom gained their experience in the Cold War nuclear forensics program – are either near retirement or already retired. The number of young people entering the field is few, which will leave the nation shorthanded of experts in the near future. The only component of nuclear forensics that appears to be growing is the construction of known nuclear material signatures in domestic and international databases. The Department of Homeland Security has recently stood up the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) with the mission of organizing the inter-government agencies. While they have made significant progress in prioritizing the various roles each agency plays in the national nuclear forensics program, without significant increases in funding they will not be able to remedy the approaching lack of infrastructure and technical expertise.
COMPONENTS OF TECHNICAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS
The best place to start a discussion of nuclear forensics is with a definition of the term. The latest definition that most players in the inter-agency program can agree on is: Nuclear forensics refers to the thorough analysis and characterization of pre- and postdetonation radiological and nuclear materials, devices, and debris, as well as prompt effects from a nuclear detonation. For brevity’s sake, this paper will focus on three fundamental categories of the nuclear forensics program that are areas of concern: Acquisition of samples, analysis of those samples, and comparison of analyzed samples to known signatures. As we will see in the next several sections, each of these three aspects of the USG nuclear forensics programs faces strong challenges for sustainability. Acquisition of Samples
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For decades, the collection of radiological samples outside of the United States has been performed by the Air force’s Constant Phoenix WC-135.5 Operated by the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), the WC-135 supports national level consumers by collecting particulate and gaseous effluents and debris from accessible regions of the atmosphere. The aircraft has technology that allows the mission crew to detect radioactive “clouds” in real time. Since 1965, the WC-135 has been the workhorse of the atmospheric collection program in support of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibits any nation from above ground nuclear weapons testing. The utility and effectiveness of this plain and the technology suite it carries has never been debated. The WC-135 played a major role in tracking radioactive debris from the Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster in 1986. In the event of a nuclear detonation, the WC-135 will almost certainly be deployed to monitor radioactive debris regardless of where in the world that detonation occurs. Unfortunately, support for the program has been decreasing. At the height of the Cold War there was a fleet of 10 planes capable of monitoring the atmosphere. Now there is only one plane. If a nuclear incident happens anywhere in the world, the capabilities of the WC-135 will be required to gather samples of radiological debris in the atmosphere. Without this capability, the nuclear forensics community would be hard pressed to provide decision makers with necessary information. Acquisition of samples is the first step in the nuclear forensics process, and the decline of the WC-135 program will have dire consequences for the entire nuclear forensics community. David Wilson of the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center has referred to the WC-135 as “our greatest asset and our thinnest resource.” One possibility of maintaining (or improving) acquisition capability is the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with similar atmospheric sampling technology. In theory, UAVs are cheaper than WC-135s and could be deployed in more places—providing a more rapid response. They also contain no crew, and could be used in situations where rapid measurements require flying directly into a highly radioactive cloud that would otherwise be harmful to the crew of a manned aircraft. Although this may seem like a quick fix to some, there are several obstacles to achieving this solution that range from the technical to the political. First and foremost among the decision to deploy UAVs is the consideration of technical capabilities. Given the scenarios being considered, it is probably not possible to replace the WC-135 with a fleet of UAVs. Although the sampling technology may be similar, UAVs are not as fast as the WC-135. One could imagine a scenario in which a nuclear explosion occurs
5
All information concerning the WC-135 was taken directly from the AFTAC webpage: http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=192
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on the East Coast and the radioactive cloud drifts out over the Atlantic Ocean. A WC-135 (if available) would be able to chase down such a cloud much faster than a UAV. In such a scenario the WC-135 (again, if available) would be able to provide the more rapid response. Secondly, it is not clear the UAVs would amount to a cost savings. Although one UAV is certainly cheaper than one WC-135, the latter has a lifespan of decades while the former has a lifespan more on the order of years. Therefore, UAVs would need to be replaced for frequently than the WC-135. Thirdly, current FAA regulations prevent the flight of UAVs within the United States over almost everything except land owned by the military. In the aftermath of nuclear event, one could speculate these regulations would be relaxed. However, under current regulations the training of UAV operators and the development of a concept of operations (CONOPS) would be difficult to implement and maintain. These are just a few of the challenges surrounding the current program of the WC-135 and the possibility of a new program involving UAVs. Analysis of Samples Once samples have been acquired, they must be analyzed. This analysis process involves multiple scientific disciplines including chemistry and nuclear chemistry, materials science, physics, and nuclear engineering—just to name a few. Of the many disciplines involved in technical nuclear forensics, nuclear chemistry and radiochemistry is often considered the long pole in the tent. Radiochemists separate and characterize the composition of complex mixtures of isotopes that would be found in predetonation nuclear material and post-detonation nuclear debris. When coupled with tools developed by nuclear physicists and engineers (e.g. computer codes for weapons design) this radiochemical analysis can provide valuable evidence of the nuclear material or design of the weapon. Given that the majority of the nation’s nuclear forensics capabilities are found in a small cadre of experts at the national laboratories, it is no surprise that most if not all of the nation’s radiochemists with nuclear forensics experience are found within the national laboratory system. As the bulk of the laboratory’s workforce approaches retirement, maintaining even current capabilities in nuclear forensics expertise will be a primary challenge for the USG nuclear forensics program.
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On October 10, 2007, a subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security, at the House of Representatives held a hearing to discuss H.R. 2631, The Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act of 2007.6 Federal officials from across the inter-agency USG nuclear forensics program were asked to testify. A recurring theme of the hearing was the sustainability of the government’s nuclear forensics workforce. In her written testimony, Carol Burns, Group Leader of the Nuclear and Radiochemistry Group at Los Alamos National Laboratory, stated:
Radiochemistry The radiochemical analysis of nuclear material from either pre-detonation interdicted material or postdetonation debris samples can provide valuable insight into the origin of the material and/or design of the weapon. Information radiochemists may be able to determine given sufficient samples (and time) include: ?? Enrichment of uranium-235. Enrichment of natural uranium in U-235 is required for a weapon. ?? Presence of plutonium and uranium-233. Could determine how long the material was in a nuclear reactor in the case of plutonium weapon. ?? Presence of medium mass metals. Suggest the use of alloys that are added to nuclear material to make more shapeable weapons components. ?? Fission Products. In the case of post-detonation debris the presence of fission products (and activation of normally neutral materials) can help determine the efficiency of the exploded device and the preexplosion isotopic content of the fuel. Sources: Nuclear Forensic Analysis, Moody, Hutcheon and Grant, Taylor and Francis (2005). W.H. Dunlop and H.P. Smith, Arms Control Today, (October 2006).
The Laboratories face challenges in recruiting and retaining a qualified workforce to carry out elements of this important work. The overall aging demographic of the NNSA workforce is well known. In 2006, NNSA indicated that about 40% of nuclear weapons program technical staff members were eligible for retirement. . . Of those workers the laboratories identified as working on nuclear forensics efforts for more than 50% of their effort, the majority are more than 50 years old.7
In her oral testimony, Dr. Burns went on to say, “in some cases we have retirees staffing significant roles.” When asked by the members of the committee if the current workforce was adequate to respond to an event such as nuclear terrorism, Dr. Burns replied: At our current staffing levels we will tax the capacity of the system with a surge of samples that might be expected after a major event such as the detonation of a nuclear device.8
Text of bill, H.R. 2631, can be found on THOMAS (http://thomas.loc.gov/). Carol Burns, written testimony, hearing on H.R. 2631, the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act of 2007. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats Cyber-security and Science and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, October 10, 2007. 8 Burns, ibid.
6 7
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The current staffing level to which Dr. Burns refers is the number of radiochemists across the entire national laboratory complex. This number is speculated to be approximately 250 full-time employees (FTEs) that have radiochemistry experience. The natural process of attrition leads the labs to predict they will need to hire 25 new radiochemists per year just to maintain the present number of FTEs. This is an enormous challenge for the labs because universities are simply not producing that many Ph.D.s in nuclear and radiochemistry. In 1980, there were 60 university departments that offered programs Figure 1: Radiochemistry & nuclear chemistry Ph. D.s earned in nuclear or radiochemistry. By at U.S. universities: 1970–2003. (data derived from ORISE 1970-72; NSF 1994-2003). Also from the written Testimony 2004 there were only 20. Similarly, of Carol Burns. in 1980 there were 120 university faculty members that considered themselves professors of nuclear or radiochemistry. By 2004, this number had dropped to 20. That the number of departments in 2004 and the number of faculty in 2004 is both 20 demonstrates that each of those departments has only one professor that constitutes the entirety of their radiochemistry program. A decrease in university programs obviously correlates with a decrease in graduates. Figure 1 shows the number of degrees awarded each year in nuclear and radiochemistry in the period from 1970 to 2003. As seen in the figure, the number of radiochemistry and nuclear chemistry Ph.D.s awarded by U.S. universities has declined by more than a factor of five since 1970. As stated above, the labs would like to hire 25 radiochemists a year, but universities are only producing them at a rate of five per year. At this rate, sustaining the current workforce will become impossible. This means the laboratories will rely more and more on people outside the traditional realms of radiochemistry to perform necessary roles for technical nuclear forensics. Comparison to Known Signatures Observations of nuclear explosions, collected nuclear material, and radiochemical analysis of nuclear debris can be used as data input to theoretical models. Such models have been developed over the past half century and can provide information on the design of the exploded device and possibly information on the origin of the material. In addition to the 63
information we could gain from theoretical models, being able to compare samples to a library of known material signatures would be of enormous value. One of the most popular discussions surrounding the emergence of nuclear forensics as a tool for attribution is the need for a national database (and possibly an international database) of nuclear material signatures. Databases have been proposed that would include relevant information from such things as commercial-use nuclear material up to and including complete weapon design parameters of all known nuclear weapons.9 While such a database poses significant problems to develop at an international level, a domestic version of a database is attainable and should be a priority for every nuclear nation. In the first few months of 2007, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive-48 simultaneously with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-17 (NSPD48/HSPD-17), which ordered the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop a Nuclear Material Information Program (NMIP).10 The NMIP, commonly referred to as a “database of databases,” is an interagency effort managed by DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence with three main objectives: 1. Develop an integrated system of information from all sources concerning worldwide nuclear material holdings and their security status; 2. As part of this effort, collect signatures of nuclear materials to support forensics and attribution assessments; and 3. Identify opportunities to work with international partners directly to share information on nuclear materials characteristics and security. The first goal of the NMIP as stated above is essentially to determine who has nuclear material and where it is stored. Only once that question is answered can the second goal, to collect signatures of nuclear materials, be realized. While progress has been made, the first two goals are easier to accomplish domestically than they are internationally. However, identifying and cataloging international sources of nuclear material is often considered an essential step in deterring nuclear terrorism. Specifically, an international database is seen as the only way of assuring a credible attribution program by making the program inherently international. The recognition of this challenge is addressed by the third goal, “identify opportunities to work with international partners.”
Michael May, Jay Davis and Ray Jeanloz, “Preparing for the Worst,” Nature 443 (October 26, 2006): 907. “How a database of nuclear…,” Luetzenkirchen & Mayer, 445 p.256 (18 Jan. 2007). 10 All information on NMIP was taken directly from the written testimony of Deputy Director Steve Aoki, submitted at the hearing on H.R. 2631, the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act of 2007. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats Cyber-security and Science and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, October 10, 2007.
9
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While the NMIP has made progress in the short time since its establishment, its task is Herculean in nature. For example, decades of data from the weapons-test program must be combed for information and cataloged in ways that were never intended. If a nuclear explosion happens either within the U.S. or elsewhere, decision makers will most certainly want to know if it was caused by a weapon stolen from the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Being able to attribute a nuclear explosion to a U.S. weapon was simply not foreseen as something DOE scientists would ever have to do. Collecting signatures of nuclear materials from other countries (either cooperatively or covertly) has equally daunting challenges. As one would expect, most nuclear states are not eager to share specific material composition or design parameters related to their nuclear weapons. One of the main challenges the NMIP faces is the recurring problem of a decreasing workforce. At a time when the government needs more people devoted to developing a nuclear materials information database, the number of people is shrinking. Most of work on the NMIP is being done at the ?? FTE level. Development of the NMIP is simply not a large part of anyone’s career.
C U R R E N T U. S . G OV E R N M E N T P R O G R A M
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) within the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) on October 1, 2006. On July 3, 2007, the President issued Annex IV of NSPD-17/HSPD-4, which made the NTNFC the inter-agency coordinator for all federal technical nuclear forensics activities. Like the broader DNDO, the Center is staffed with a mix of DHS federal employees and detailees from across the federal government. Partner agencies of the NTNFC include Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DoD), Justice (acting through the FBI), State, and the intelligence community. The Presidential policy directive that established NTNFC defined two core missions for the Center. First, the NTNFC is intended to serve as the national “capability provider,” and as such develop and advance capabilities to perform nuclear forensics on pre-detonation nuclear and radiological materials. (Post-detonation capabilities are typically the realm of Defense and DOE). The second mission for the NTNFC is to implement national-level planning, integration and stewardship across the technical nuclear forensics spectrum to assure rapid, reliable, credible and ready USG capability.11
11
Description of the NTNFC’s mission is based on the written testimony of Vayl Oxford, from the hearing on H.R. 2631, the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act of 2007. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats Cyber-security and Science and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, October 10, 2007.
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The approximate budget for the inter-agency USG technical nuclear forensics program is shown in Table 1. The dollar values shown in the table are approximate spending figures for direct funding in nuclear forensics Funding FY07 Fraction USG Department for Fiscal Year 2007. Determining (in $ millions) Homeland Security 13.3 25 % the exact amount of spending on nuclear forensics is difficult for Energy* 13.4 25 % two main reasons. Firstly, it is Defense 8.5 16 % possible that programs within the Justice 18.0 34 % agencies shown in the table (or State ** ** elsewhere) contribute to the Intel. Community ** ** program indirectly. A research or Total $53.2 100 % training program not directly funding by an office or agency Table 1: Approximate spending values for USG programs devoted to nuclear forensics could that contribute directly to nuclear forensics. *Indirect funding still be utilized by the national for nuclear forensics programs at DOE in FY07 was approximately $54.2 million. **Data not available. forensics program. Secondly, even though some of the current research programs at the agencies may be decades old, many of these programs are new. This makes it particularly difficult to track the progress of spending prior to the last several years. For example, most of the agencies initiated programs with words such as “nuclear forensics” or “attribution” in their name in the last seven years. Although spending for these programs is easy to quantify, it makes it difficult to compare research programs that may have performed similar functions under other names. As we can see from Table 1, the Department of Homeland Security’s share of the national nuclear forensics program is 25%. This puts that department in the interesting position of being the inter-agency coordinator – charged with doing research as well as implementing “national-level planning, integration and stewardship” across the technical nuclear forensics spectrum – with relatively small funds to accomplish its goals. H.R. 2631, the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act of 2007, authorized an increase in the budget for the NTNFC up to $20 million, but that bill was stalled in committee in the first session of the 110th Congress. The Omibus Appropriations Act for FY08 provided $15 million for the NTNFC ($2 million below the requested amount). An increase from $13.3 to $15 million is a welcome increase to be sure, but less than sufficient to meet all the NTNFC’s challenging goals.
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WHAT NEEDS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED?
If policy makers are serious about making attribution the new foundation of nuclear deterrence, the challenges associated with the USG technical nuclear forensics program need to be addressed head-on and as quickly as possible. Acquisition of samples is the first step in attribution process. In any post-detonation scenario the rapid collection of aerial samples will be of paramount importance. One WC135 is not enough. As stated above, not even a fleet of UAVs would be appropriate for replacing the WC-135. However, the incorporation of UAVs into the current atmospheric collection program could greatly extend capabilities to rapidly acquire samples. The CONOPs for such a system should be developed and exercised for event scenarios occurring within and outside of the continental United States. Regulations set by the FAA should be examined and possibly amended to provide for the federal agency’s use of UAVs within the United States. Possibly the most important and urgent challenge facing the USG technical nuclear forensics program is the sustainability of the workforce. Rapid acquisition of samples will be of little use without t trained and experienced experts to analysis those samples and interpret the results. The nation is losing radiochemists faster than universities are producing them. Unlike other technical disciplines (i.e. computer sciences and engineering) the deficit of students cannot be decreased by expanding foreign national admissions to U.S. universities. The nature of nuclear forensics work and its relevance to national security requires trained professionals that can obtain security clearance. This often restricts the pool of recruits to solely U.S. nationals. We must increase the number of students in radiochemistry and associated nuclear forensics programs. We must also increase the number of faculty in the same programs. Unfortunately, universities often have even less funding available to them than the national agencies. The dominant source of funding for academic programs in nuclear forensics is the Department of Energy. In FY06 and FY07 the DOE spent $1.275 million on the Radiochemistry Education Award Program (REAP).12 Approximately half of these funds went to student fellowships, while the other half was used for junior faculty awards. While such funds are useful, this level of funding for academic programs is insufficient. As mentioned above, the labs would like to hire 25 radiochemists per year just to maintain current levels of capability. Given the broad nature of technical nuclear forensics and the
12
For information on the REAP program, see the DOE website: http://www.ne.doe.gov/universityPrograms/neUniversity2g.html
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aspects of both applied and basic science that could be leveraged by the national program funding streams for relevant research should be made available by agencies other than DOE. The natural choices for such funding streams are the National Science Foundation (in the case of basic research) and the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (in the case of more applied research). We must also work to retain – or in the case of some retirees – pass on knowledge that was acquired conducting actual tests of nuclear weapons. This could be accomplished by establishing visiting-professor fellowships for experienced scientists at the national laboratories. We need to get those “retirees staffing significant roles” that Dr. Carol Burns mentioned into the classroom. Teaching is a far more productive use of a retiree’s time—in some cases, the time they have remaining is the only time we have remaining. As mentioned above, the construction of nuclear material databases is getting lots of attention and appears to be at least one aspect of the program that is growing. Hopefully this will continue. Again, one of the biggest challenges the database program has is workforce. Most people working on the databases are doing so at the ?? FTE level. We need to provide significant funding to make this work a large part of people’s careers. One of the biggest challenges in developing a database program was not addressed by this paper: how to implement an international database. Such a discussion is incredibly challenging and beyond the scope of this paper. Models for an international database have been proposed based on systems currently used by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) at Karlsruhe, Germany. As part of European Commission’s Joint Research Centre the ITU maintains a quasi-international database of nuclear and radiological material information, and since the 1990’s has been involved in analysis of seized materials from illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials.13 An offshoot of ITU, the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) is comprised of experts from 28 countries and is the focus of international discussion for such issues as nuclear forensics. The ITWG meets once each year to work on issues concerning illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. The group’s objectives include developing protocols for collecting evidence, prioritizing techniques for forensic analyses of nuclear and associated nonnuclear samples, conducting interlaboratory forensic exercises, and developing forensic databanks to assist in interpretation.14 Although nothing has been formalized, in the next few years ITWG may very well develop a plan for an international database of nuclear material information.
Klaus Luetzenkirchen and Klaus Mayer “How a Database of Nuclear Databases Could Help the Effort to Combat Trafficking,” Nature 445 (January 18, 2007): 256 14 For more information on ITWG see: http://www-cmls.llnl.gov/?url=science_and_technology-chemistrynuclear_forensics
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The USG has made progress in coordinating the vast inter-agency technical nuclear forensics program. The establishment of the NTNFC in 2006 within the Department of Homeland Security was an excellent step in the right direction. For the first time, the nation has a onestop shop on national technical nuclear forensics capabilities. With limited funds, the NTNFC has made progress in determining and prioritizing the roles of the various agencies, accessing government capabilities (or the lack thereof), and exercising those capabilities in a coordinated and cohesive manner. The funding for this program should continue to be increased to a level that is commensurate with their responsibilities—especially (as this paper recommends) if funding streams for academic research programs are made available from agencies outside of DOE such as the NTNFC. While the USG national technical nuclear forensics program has made enormous progress in the last several years, significant challenges remain. Some of these challenges will require examination of current federal regulations, such as FAA restrictions on the flying of UAVs. Others, like the deficit of students earning technical degrees in the fields of nuclear forensics, will require an increase in funding. Still others will involve political and diplomatic challenges. But all of these challenges will require the political will and determination of policy makers to address these problems head on and as quickly as possible. Only with a robust and sustainable program for technical nuclear forensics can we have a credible program of attribution. Only then can we rely on attribution for successful deterrence of nuclear terrorism.
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Discussion on Key Elements and Enablers of the UK Version of a ‘Responsive Infrastructure’
HEATHER PRAGNELL1
ABSTRACT
The UK infrastructure to provide and maintain Britain’s nuclear warheads has always been relatively small, with closely located facilities. Following a review of these facilities in the early 2000’s it was acknowledged that investment was required in order to maintain the UK nuclear weapons capability such that it would be able to respond to any future HMG requirements in a timely fashion. In order to progress significant capital expenditure on physical, or ‘hard’ infrastructure, changes were also required in the ‘soft’ infrastructure of Management and Operational systems, thus ensuring that HMG had confidence in the ability of AWE to deliver the current and any future program to time and cost, with an emphasis on safety and reliability. Physical infrastructure is clearly essential, but real responsiveness is also reliant on many additional elements of ‘soft’ infrastructure. Three areas highlighted in this paper are Knowledge Management, Communications, and ‘Lean Process’ development. This discussion gives some detail of the changes being sought in these areas at AWE and how they are being achieved. In contrast to the UK approach, which significantly de-couples the decision to maintain a nuclear weapons capability from any future Government decision with regard to the Trident warhead, the US realization of the proposed Responsive Infrastructure (Complex 2030) is inextricably linked with the current debate on RRW. The current reluctance of Congress to approve and progress RRW is therefore delaying what may be seen as essential, and generally non-controversial, Weapons Complex transformation. In discussing the approach to UK infrastructure transformation, it may be an opportunity for the US to move some focus back on to achievable ‘soft’ infrastructure goals. It is the view of the author that setting and achieving these key goals would go some way to gaining the confidence of the US Administration in the ability of the weapons complex to maintain future transformational
?? British Crown Copyright 2007/MOD 1 The opinions and views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of AWE, the UK MoD, or HMG.
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activities whilst at the same time delivering RRW, or indeed, any requirements that arise from emerging threats.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
The UK Infrastructure to provide and maintain Britain’s nuclear weapons has always been relatively small, with closely located facilities. Following a review of these facilities it was acknowledged that investment was required in order to maintain the UK nuclear weapons capability. The Government decision to invest in the facilities has been essentially decoupled from the decision to be made with regard to a Trident successor warhead. This is in contrast to the US decision to use the RRW as a key enabler of the weapons complex infrastructure transformation. This paper presents a brief discussion on some of the key areas being addressed in order to move AWE towards being the UK version of a ‘Responsive Infrastructure.’ Although the term ‘Responsive’ is not defined here, and whilst it is true to say that the UK and US definition would vary, there are enough similarities to make the UK experience informative to the US and their plans for weapons complex modernization. Initially the discussion will briefly examine the UK situation, and why a need for change was identified, before moving on to talk specifically about some of the changes currently under way at AWE. Finally there is some discussion about aspects of the UK experience that may have relevance to the US as they consider the possible modernization of their weapons facilities, with some thought given as to possible areas for UK/US collaboration. The task of transforming the extensive US weapons infrastructure and achieving Complex 2030 is clearly huge, however by linking this with RRW it seems that the lack of progress with decisions on RRW is having a detrimental and delaying effect on the possibility of transforming the US weapons complex infrastructure. It may be that by starting with ‘soft’ infrastructure improvements the US could obtain surprising results, build confidence and provide a strong framework in which to manage the physical infrastructure transformation. By presenting some of the elements of the UK weapons complex transformation, it is hoped that this will provide encouragement, and inform the decisions that are currently being made in the US. Indeed, a re-focus of thinking on to achievable ‘soft’ infrastructure goals may provide a route out of the current impasse that appears to have developed around RRW.
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T H E U K S I T UA T I O N
In the early 2000’s there was a Government sponsored review of the UK’s nuclear weapons infrastructure, with the obvious inclusion of the facilities at AWE Aldermaston, and the nearby establishment at Burghfield. The review acknowledged that investment was required in order to maintain the UK nuclear weapons capability and the ability to respond to any future HMG requirements in a timely fashion. This investment was implemented with the commencement of the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Program (NWCSP). At the time of the infrastructure review the Government was aware that the Trident system had been designed with a nominal finite lifetime, but even so, the Government decision on the need to maintain a nuclear warhead design capability was essentially de-coupled from the future decision regarding Trident maintenance or replacement. Indeed, AWE’s design capability, and the associated modernization of the infrastructure, continues even though a decision on a successor warhead is yet to be made. In order for the UK to progress significant capital expenditure on physical or ‘hard’ infrastructure, changes were first required in Management and Operational systems, or ‘soft’ infrastructure, thus ensuring that HMG had confidence in the ability of AWE to deliver the current and any future program to time and cost, with an emphasis on safety and reliability. In other words, there was a need to show that the investment was sound, which then allowed AWE Management Limited to successfully negotiate an increase in the management contract from 10 years to 25 years, thus allowing efficiencies to be gained from the longer planning horizons. The attention given to the ‘soft’ infrastructure elements in the UK appears to be in stark contrast to the US position that is focusing on hard infrastructure related to RRW decisions, with the need for management and organizational changes being further down the agenda Regarding the need for modernization and upgrade of the US infrastructure, the US position has been to consistently describe RRW as “essential to enable a Responsive Infrastructure.”2 However, by linking the two it seems that the difficulty in gaining approval for RRW is having a detrimental effect on the possibility of transforming the weapons complex infrastructure. Although the legacy stockpile is strong and changes are not urgent, the same
Thomas P. D’Agostino in a statement before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, March 20th 2007. “…a transformation vision and strategy, the cornerstones of which are Complex 2030 and the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).”
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cannot be said for all parts of the ‘nuclear infrastructure’ and although the need to update the infrastructure is generally not controversial, essential action is being delayed.3
T R A N S F O R M I N G T H E I N F R A S T RU C T U R E A T A W E
There is a considerable program of work being undertaken to improve the physical infrastructure at AWE. There is a continuous drive towards developing modern manufacturing processes and in realizing modern office accommodation that is fit for purpose. This transformation of the infrastructure is happening at the same time as the rationalization and maintenance of existing facilities. There are also major capital investment projects such as the ORION laser facility, the REDWOOD supercomputer, and the HYDRUS project to provide a modern multi-axis radiographic capability. However, a responsive infrastructure is not just physical. It is also reliant on many other elements including the three topics that are covered in more depth in this discussion: Knowledge Management, Communications, and Understanding and Improving Processes, e.g. Lean Process Development. To differentiate these more intangible elements, these are termed as ‘soft’ infrastructure. With the huge capital investment underway at AWE it has become clear that there is a requirement for responsiveness within these elements of the ‘soft’ infrastructure. AWE has already achieved significant transformation in these areas and these successes have provided HMG with confidence in the ability of AWE to deliver the current and any future program to time and cost, with an emphasis on safety and reliability. This has placed AWE in a strong position to move forward with the capital expenditure. An additional aspect of ‘soft’ infrastructure transformation that the US could consider is that improvement may be achieved with less capital outlay and hence less risk than may be assessed for large capital expenditure schemes. In addition to this there is also scope for ‘soft’ infrastructure systems to evolve with the changing demands resulting from ‘hard’ infrastructure development. A further area that has been addressed at AWE, but will not be discussed further here, has been significant investment and company resolve to providing training that will equip managers with the skills necessary to successfully drive forward all the elements of the infrastructure transformation.
3
Sidney D Drell. Feature Article in Physics Today June 2007: The challenge of nuclear weapons. “The RRW’s stated purpose is to transform both the nuclear infrastructure and the nuclear weapons themselves so the US can maintain long-term high confidence in its arsenal as it reduces the arsenals size…The part of the RRW program that is directed at transforming the nuclear infrastructure is important and generally not controversial. The infrastructure needs serious attention.”
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Knowledge Management A key requirement of ‘Knowledge Management’ is capturing, in an appropriate format, what is already known by experienced individuals and teams. This information may be both explicit, i.e. what is already written down, and implicit, i.e. information that is just ‘known’ and is passed by word-of-mouth, or gained by experience but has never been formally recorded. In terms of knowledge management, it is particularly difficult to see how it would be possible to capture ‘expert judgment’. As well as capturing the information, there is also the requirement to then propagate data to the areas and groups that need to have access to, and use, the information. These efficient communications between processes are being pursued through Project CONNECT, as discussed below. Knowledge management is also enabled by ensuring appropriate IT infrastructure, and a feature of appropriate software is that knowledge capture from future work and processes can be embedded within the system. AWE also has a defined ‘Outreach Strategy’. Not a purely altruistic endeavor, this allows AWE to benefit from knowledge, expertise and the facilities of academia, institutions and industry, both in the UK and internationally. Communications As well as being essential to enable ‘Knowledge Management’, in order to be responsive, it is clear that AWE must move towards a network of communications that are fit for purpose with a focus on incorporating modern business practices, accounting capabilities and crossprogrammatic information. This transition to modern business communications has been addressed by the implementation of a single system across AWE under the program of work in project UNITE. One important feature of this is the amalgamation of the numerous business information systems that were previously used across AWE. Data now needs to be entered into this system only once and it can then be managed, accessed and analyzed as required. Even so, some areas have had to accept an increase in cost overhead and difficulty because the overall company benefit outweighs individual cost. As well as business management, communications is also a key feature of how AWE interacts with, and satisfies the requirements of, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) and other regulatory bodies, as they need to be supplied with clearly available and verifiable information. For example, regulators need to be confident in the system for tracking and maintaining mandatory safety and security training.
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The management of technical, sensitive information is being addressed via project CONNECT. This also includes the requirement to have compatible, configurable and up-todate information. Efficient access to all relevant information is necessary in analyzing data to underwrite nuclear performance without recourse to a UGT. In addition, prompt access to geometry and measurement data can be used to speed-up data analysis that may be necessary in manufacturing processes. Understanding and Developing Lean Processes AWE is also intending to improve cost and time assessments by ensuring that processes are ‘Lean’. This means that work is carried out efficiently, successfully and safely so that there is no waste. The assessment and development of current processes at AWE, and the move towards ‘Lean’ processes is also being done via project CONNECT. It should be noted that in order to achieve ‘Lean’ it is necessary to have company-wide understanding and buy-in, from directors all the way through to the shop-floor. It is also important to ensure that management structures do not encourage ‘stove piping’ and empire building which creates barriers to effective ‘Lean’ process operation. Although perhaps easier to do on a single site, by examining success achieved by large international companies, e.g. Lockheed Martin, it is clear that a dispersed physical infrastructure is not a barrier to adopting the ‘Lean’ philosophy. One key aspect of ‘Lean’ is that benefit can be gained by applying it to sub-processes, but perhaps more importantly, success with sub-processes is a good way of gaining the confidence that change can be achieved; this is confidence both within the company, and that of the customer which may be the UK or US government.4
ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES
As well as the three areas noted here there are additional challenges to be addresses in other areas of ‘soft’ infrastructure. For example, responsiveness should also be sought within: Design, Engineering and Manufacture. An important element of being responsive will include the ability to de-conflict requirements, which clearly needs an overview of operations.
4
Ohio Republican Congressman David Hobson. Quote from a November 2006 letter written to Energy Secretary Samual Bodman “RRW is a deal with Congress [that] requires a serious effort by the Department to … downsize the weapons complex. Absent that, there is no deal.”
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A further important element is to ensure responsive Assurance. In both the UK and US there is a quite different safety and security environment than was prevalent during the Cold War era. In 2006, AWE lost ‘Crown Immunity’, becoming subject to the same planning regulations as all other businesses; the result of this has been to increase public scrutiny and increase the volume of information released in to the public domain. Obviously it is necessary to respond to the new assurance environment, but it is equally important to ensure that the infrastructure does not become paralyzed by unnecessarily stringent constrains.5
U K L E S S O N S F O R T H E U S I N F R A S T RU C T U R E T R A N S F O R M A T I O N
Whereas the UK Government made a commitment to ensure that the nuclear warhead capability is maintained, and the weapons complex infrastructure improved, irrespective of the decision on a Trident successor warhead, the US decision on infrastructure transformation is reliant upon RRW approval. Given the problems with gaining approval and funding for the RRW program,6, 7 it would seem prudent to ask, “Is this approach still feasible?” One of the delays affecting RRW is the question of a defined long term strategy and policy being required in advance of developing a responsive infrastructure. This is somewhat confusing given that the whole concept is to have a ‘flexible infrastructure that is responsive to emerging threats.’ Even if the question is ‘do you build 30 or 100 pits a year?’8 responsiveness allows for the capability to build 100 pits per year but to actually build according to requirement. It may be that by forming the infrastructure around the requirements of RRW there is the danger that future flexibility is lost. In other words, maintain a diversity of capabilities (currently maintain weapons systems) as a hedge against common failure modes. In addition, a danger in limiting design and research options to the RRW option may give rise
As highlighted by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities Report Summary, December 2006 by Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Concerning Pantex operations: “The sharpest decline in productivity was between 1995 and 1999 and is primarily due to restrictive processes in response to safety and security concerns”. 6 Walter Pincus, “New Nuclear Warhead’s Funding Eliminated,” Washington Post, May 24, 2007. “The House Appropriations subcommittee … voted yesterday to eliminate all money that would have paid for engineering and cost studies for the new nuclear warhead … subcommittee Chairman Peter J. Visclosky (DPa.) said there would be funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program "only when a future nuclear weapons strategy is established." In so doing, he echoed a call for such a study that was included in the fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization Bill, which passed the House last week.” 7 Haninah Levine, “Birth of a Notion,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (July/Aug 2007). “Hobsons growing concern is that the nuclear weapons complex is running off with the carrot (the new work provided by RRW) while avoiding the stick (painful cuts in the size of the complex) has highlighted a significant loss of congressional enthusiasm for RRW in the last year.” 8 Bruce Tarter, “The Bulletin Interview,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 2007).
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to difficulty in anticipating innovations that could lead to the proliferation capability of ‘rogue’ states. The UK experience would seem to indicate that even though changes to the physical infrastructure are relatively slow to implement, tackling areas of ‘soft’ infrastructure is also essential in realizing a responsive infrastructure. In considering the changes being undertaken in the UK, it would seem that there are certain areas that present an opportunity for useful UK-US collaboration in developing secure communications, knowledge management tools, process development, etc. For example, as stated in the White paper, nuclear forensics work is being strengthened at AWE and is just one area where fast secure communications may prove beneficial. In addition to this, process development may also provide an opportunity for sharing best practice.
S U M M A RY
In summary, the aim of this discussion has been to highlight some of the areas of ‘soft’ infrastructure changes that are being pursued at AWE. It is also important to note that investment to maintain capability has been de-coupled from the decision regarding any UK successor warhead. In order to move forward with the investment it was necessary for AWE to demonstrate that it was able to efficiently manage operations and projects such that they would be delivered to time and cost. Without the strong focus on achieving ‘soft’ infrastructure improvement, the capability to demonstrate competence and capability would have been more challenging and ultimately more costly. The program to consolidate and improve the business areas of communications, via project UNITE, is now completed. The technical communications areas are being addressed via project CONNECT, and that program of work is currently progressing well. The physical infrastructure, for example the ORION laser and the HYDRUS experimental facility are being developed; as expected they are proving challenging and the difficulty of physical infrastructure transformation should not be underestimated. Clearly there are differences in the UK and US definitions and requirements for a responsive infrastructure, nevertheless there are areas that provide an opportunity for mutually beneficial and indeed appropriate collaboration. Finally, it is the view of the author that, were the US to de-couple some elements of ‘soft’ infrastructure change from the decision to proceed with RRW, it may allow progress and 78
consequently build confidence in the ability of the weapons complex to transform itself into a cost effective responsive infrastructure, as envisaged in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. I do not believe that this contradicts the hope of a “Balanced and Integrated US Approach to 21st Century Nuclear Issues,”9 rather that it will provide an impetus to start the process.
Clark Murdock and Jim Miller, “Balanced and Integrated US Approach to 21st Century Nuclear Issues, Version 2,” (June 2007). “The premise of this paper is that the interactive effects between these disparate nuclear issues are sufficiently strong that they cannot be addressed in piecemeal fashion but need to be addressed holistically. It is our belief that if solutions are developed and communicated as part of a package deal, there is a real possibility of a bipartisan consensus….”
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Nuclear Proliferation in Asia: China and India
GARETH R. WILLIAMS
ABSTRACT
It is sometimes asserted that China has ambitions to join the ‘big two’ nuclear powers (America and Russia, with their thousands of warheads and multiple delivery systems) and that India wishes to become a ‘small global power’ akin to the UK and France. At present, both countries have a long way to go before they could achieve these aims. The two countries operate doctrines of credible minimum deterrence in which they would aim to withstand a nuclear strike before retaliating. At the present time, it is reasonable to conclude that both the conventional and nuclear forces of the two countries are balanced: India does not fear China’s superior troop numbers, and either could cause unacceptable damage to the other using its nuclear arsenal. It has been confirmed by a wide variety of sources that widespread modernization of nuclear forces in both China and India is underway. This modernization comprises both increases in warhead numbers and the deployment of more capable delivery vehicles. It is assessed that for both countries the modernization stems from the desire to ensure a survivable deterrent. Economic and international relations factors mean that it is unlikely that either plans a step-change in capabilities. Should one country do so, the other would be unlikely to follow suit provided the latter felt its deterrent retained sufficient value. Please note the views expressed herein are mine alone, and are not intended to represent those of the Ministry of Defence, or of Her Majesty’s Government.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
In their current forms both India and China are relatively young countries. Independent India was formed on 15 August 1947, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed on 1 October 1949. Tibet was not incorporated into the PRC until 1951. However, both have long and distinguished histories. Long before Europe and America underwent an intellectual awakening, Chinese and Indian intellectuals were making great discoveries in science and medicine. China and India spent much of the 20th century struggling with development issues, but in the 1990s and with the coming of the 21st century the two countries have enjoyed spectacular economic growth. China’s economy grew by 10.6
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% in 2006 alone; India’s averaged 6 % over the 10 years between 1996 and 2006.1 Both also wield ever increasing international influence. Between them they contain over a third of the world’s population (almost 38 % in 2000).2 Therefore, the paths which India and China choose to take in their future development will be of immense importance worldwide. India and China have historically had a difficult relationship, exemplified by a messy border war in 1962 in which India was humiliated. There is significant mistrust between the two powers, which makes each acutely conscious of the actions of the other. Both states have a nuclear deterrent capability, and in both cases these deterrents are undergoing significant modernization. It is often asserted that both states wish to make significant enhancements to the destructive power of their capabilities – that China wishes to join the ‘big two’ nuclear powers (the US and Russia) with their thousands of warhead and multiple delivery systems, and that India aspires to join the ‘small global’ nuclear powers (such as the UK and France), which have much smaller arsenals than the ‘big two’ but still with a global reach. A significant change in the nuclear capabilities of either or both countries would lead to a radical shift in the global balance of nuclear power, and would require other nuclear and non-nuclear states to undertake comprehensive reviews of their doctrines and postures. This paper will review the Chinese and Indian deterrent capabilities and doctrine and consider the methods of and rationale for modernization. Sino-Indian history will be discussed, and efforts made to determine the nuclear interplay that exists between the two.
C H I NA’ S N U C L E A R D E T E R R E N T
China’s decision to develop a nuclear deterrent in the 1950s is thought to be in large part a response to perceived nuclear threats from the US. During the Korean War, MacArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons against China. He was prevented from doing so, but this possibility clearly caused significant anxiety to the Chinese authorities, who decided that the threat could be best negated by development of independent nuclear deterrent (rather than accepting the Soviet nuclear umbrella).
?? British Crown Copyright 2007/MOD. Published with the permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty’s Stationery Office. 1 See for instance: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6360069.stm (China) and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4748358.stm (India). 2 World Population to 2300. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2004. http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/WorldPop2300final.pdf
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The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists assesses that China has some 130 operational warheads and some 70 in storage, giving a total of some 200 warheads.3 This is the most reliable estimate currently available, but the number has previously been assessed to be much higher (some estimates as high as 400 warheads).4 China has a full triad of land, sea and air delivery systems. That said, it is worthy of note that the Chinese SSBN (Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear – a nuclear powered submarine carrying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles) has never patrolled, and that only one was ever built. SSBN programs are extremely expensive and it is not cost-effective to build a single boat, which implies there were significant problems with the development of the Chinese SSBN. It is thought that China has some 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the US. More details of China’s nuclear arsenal are given in Table 1.
Table 1: China’s nuclear arsenal. (Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May/June 2006) Delivery system Current Short-range land-based missile Medium-range land-based missile Intercontinental land-based missile Sea-launched missile Nuclear-capable aircraft In development Intercontinental land-based missile Sea-launched missile Range /km 2,100 3,100 5,500 – 12,000 1,000 – 1,700 3,100 8,000 – 12,000 ca. 8,000 No. 21 16 42 12 ca. 40 ? ? Warheads / Warhead delivery sys. yield / kt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 200 - 300 3,300 3,300 – 5,000 200 - 300 ? ? ?
China has never publicly stated its nuclear doctrine, but it is generally agreed by informed commentators that China operates a policy of credible minimum deterrence. This means that China would aim to survive an attack on it and then retaliate – it would launch after attack, not on attack or on warning. Officials from China have said that “China will only use nuclear weapons to prevent blackmail and coercion by other nuclear weapons states” and “Chinese nuclear weapons are kept at the lowest readiness level consistent with national security”. Both these statements are consistent with a position of minimum deterrence. Further evidence to support a minimum deterrence posture may be derived from a number of Chinese policy statements which have been made public.5 China has a no first use policy for nuclear weapons (NW). It offers negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states (i.e. it has guaranteed not to use NW against a state that did not posses them). China
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, Hans M “NDRC: Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces 2006,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May/June 2006): 60-63. 4 NDRC: Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces 1999. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May/June 1999): 7980. 5 http://www.nti.org/db/china/doctrine.htm.
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additionally takes part in nuclear weapon free zones, for instance in Africa and Latin America.6 It has signed (but not ratified) the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and publicly advocates the complete destruction of NW.
I N D I A’ S N U C L E A R D E T E R R E N T
India is thought to have some 50 to 60 nuclear warheads,7 but is believed to be increasing this number. It has land and air delivery systems, both which can operate only over a short range. In addition, India has recently developed a crude sea delivery system, comprising a ship-mounted ballistic missile. A summary of India’s nuclear arsenal is given in Table 2. Table 2: India’s nuclear arsenal. (Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007).
Delivery system Current Short-range land-based missile Nuclear-capable aircraft In development Short-range land-based missile Medium-range land-based missile Sea-launched missile Range /km 150 – 2,000 1,600 – 3,000 > 300 > 3,000 ca. 350 No. ? ? ? ? ? Warheads / Warhead delivery sys. yield / kt ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
The emphasis on short-range delivery systems arose as a result of India’s rivalry with Pakistan, which was the principal driver for both countries to develop nuclear weapons. An excellent account of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities may be found in the presentation delivered by Dr. Michael Tkacik at the Project on Nuclear Issues’ capstone conference at U.S. Strategic Command on November 29, 2007,8 and I shall not dwell on that country here. Suffice to say that India and Pakistan have had an extremely troubled relationship since their foundation in 1947, illustrated in Figure 2. This includes three wars, the third of which led to the division of Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh.
Statement on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone by the Chinese Delegation at the First Session of the Preparation Committee of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjfywj/t317968.htm. 7 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “NDRC: Nuclear Notebook: Indian Nuclear Forces 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (July/August 2007): 74-78. 8 A copy of this presentation is available on the PONI members only website accessible via http://www.csis.org/isp/poni/.
6
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1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
1947
First IndoPakistan war.
1965
Second IndoPakistan war. 1971 Third IndoPakistan war.
1984
Siachin dispute.
1999
Kargil border skirmish.
1998 Both countries conduct NW tests.
Figure 2: A graphical representation of Indo-Pakistani history. India has released some statements on its nuclear posture.9, 10 Like China it has a posture of credible minimum deterrence: in the event of a nuclear exchange, India would withstand an attack and then retaliate. India says that its priorities are economic and political development. It feels that to achieve these it must possess NW, because other states have them and India does not want to be in a position whereby nuclear threats could be used to coerce it. India also has a no first use policy, and had pledged not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states. However, the no first use policy only applies to a nuclear attack: India has said that it would consider using nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack.7 This suggests that India my see NW as more of a military weapon than other NW states do, particularly against Pakistan. There are in addition some signs that India could be moving towards a more aggressive nuclear doctrine: an Indian Ministry of Defence report in 2005 rejected “doctrines or postures of launch on warning”,11 but this was not repeated in the 2006 report.9
MODERNIZATION OF THE CHINESE AND INDIAN NUCLEAR DETERRENTS
How and why There is no dispute that both India and China are undergoing significant modernization of their nuclear deterrent capabilities.12 This modernization takes the form both of increased numbers of warheads and more capable delivery vehicles. Some sources believe that China will deploy some 500 warheads by 2015.3 It is working on maneuverable and multiple-
Indian Ministry of Defence, 2006 Annual Defence Report, pp 10, 12. http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html. 11 Indian Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2004-5, pp 14-16. 12 See for instance http://www.nti.ord/db/China/wnwmdat.htm.
9 10
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warhead delivery vehicles, and is developing a new SSBN. Russia is reported to be (but denies) assisting in these endeavors.13 Unnamed sources have claimed that India plans to deploy 300 to 400 warheads by 2012.7 It is aiming to deploy a complete triad, developing new ballistic missiles and sea-based capabilities. India is trying to develop an indigenous SSBN, but there are also reports that it is attempting to lease an SSBN from Russia.14 Command and control capabilities are a key target for future research and development, these being probably the weakest part of India’s deterrent system. Connected to deterrence, India is additionally developing a missile defense system. There are a number of factors underlying the modernization of both countries’ deterrents. A crucial rationale is the upgrade of aging equipment, which is becoming ever more difficult and expensive to maintain. A second driver is to increase the survivability of the countries’ nuclear deterrents. As countermeasures become increasingly capable, more proficient delivery systems or larger numbers of warheads must be deployed to retain a given level of survivability. This is particularly important with a minimum deterrence posture, where a country would seek to survive an attack before retaliating. In order for such a deterrence posture to be credible, you require a high level of confidence that a fraction of your nuclear arsenal sufficient for a response would survive the first attack. In the case of China, its ca. 20 missiles capable of reaching the US are static. Therefore, if the US were to deploy ballistic missile defense (BMD) against China’s deterrent, China could not be confident that it would be able to respond to a US first strike on it. The US may well be able to knock out almost all of China’s ICBMs with the first strike, and then rely on BMD to protect it from the remainder. To ensure it could respond to a US first strike, China would need to have some missiles that the US could not destroy with the attack – for instance on an SSBN – and/or have a deterrent which stood a high chance of penetrating the BMD umbrella. This latter aim could be achieved by using penetration aids to present a large array of targets to a BMD system and increase the likelihood of a nuclear warhead getting through, via the use of multiple or maneuverable warheads, or a combination of these techniques. There are other factors which are also important in understanding the rationale behind India and China’s modernization programs. The first is prestige. Some take the view that China and India both feel themselves to be great world powers, and feel that the possession of NW is a characteristic of a great power. While there may be some truth in this, it is my thesis that prestige is a relatively minor driver for the modernization programs, and that for both nations, the affordability of modernization is crucial. This argument will be expanded later.
13 14
See for instance http://www.nti.org/db/china/wsubdat.htm. http://inhome.rediff.com/news/2002/feb/05inrus.htm.
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Local influences are imperative. The dynamic between India and China themselves will be discussed later. The influence of Pakistan is particularly important for India, as was discussed earlier, but China must also have some concerns about Pakistan’s ownership of NW given the current instability in that country, and the rise of religious fundamentalists prepared to commit suicide for their cause. North Korea also poses a concern to China: the regime of Kim Jong-Il appears to be engaging with the international community with regard to its nuclear program at present,15 but it has reneged on its promises before,16 and there is always the danger that the regime could collapse, leaving a nuclear-armed failed state on China’s border. An additional concern is that, because of the strong historic ties between the two powers, North Korea’s actions could drag China into an unwanted dispute. Japan is another key influence for China. Japan does not possess nuclear weapons, but it has the protection of the US nuclear umbrella, and is itself a latent nuclear power with the ability to field a weapon within as little as 12 months of a decision to do so. Indeed, some conservatives in Japanese political circles were advocating the development of NW in 2006 at the time of the North Korean missile and NW tests.17 The actions of the US are vital to understanding China’s nuclear deterrent program. There is very significant concern in China’s government that the US BMD system could defeat China’s immobile NW systems. In particular, there is concern that the US might deploy BMD in Taiwan, which would lead to a considerable rise in tensions in the region. Certainly, BMD could reduce the perceived value of China’s deterrent in the US – that is to say, with BMD the US might feel less threatened by China’s NW and may change its behavior accordingly. China is desperate to avoid this happening, since China regards its deterrent as being worth what the US thinks it is worth. Therefore, the US BMD program is an important driver to China’s NW modernization.18 Some regard China’s modernization as being linked to a shift in deterrence posture, with China moving from a minimum deterrence posture to a limited deterrence posture. The latter would allow China to control escalation in the event of nuclear war. This posture would involve a shift from a launch after attack doctrine to one of launch on attack, or even on warning. However, I am skeptical of this idea. More sophisticated weaponry is needed to maintain a limited deterrence posture than one of minimum deterrence. China has had the capability to produce multiple re-entry vehicles (a key technology for a limited deterrence posture) for over 20 years, and hence could have adopted such a posture in the mid- to late15 See for instance: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7145007.stm, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7128688.stm, and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asiapacific/6760579.stm. 16 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6032857.stm. 17 Snyder, Scott. Responses to North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Capitulation or Collective Action? Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2007, pp 33-43. http://www.twq.com/07autumn/docs/07autumn_snyder.pdf. 18 See for instance: http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA20020722383 and http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f2h2_2.html.
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1980s. It would seem peculiar for China to make the switch now rather than 20 years go when the Cold War was extant. Chinese nuclear ambitions The idea held by some that China has aspirations to join the ‘big two’ nuclear powers (the US and Russia) was explained in the introduction. I think it is unlikely that China holds such ambitions. China certainly has a very long way to go before it could do so – more than a forty-fold increase in operational warhead numbers (Russia and the US each field some 5,700 operational warheads)19, 20 and massive investment in research and development of advanced capabilities. Both of these would be extremely expensive. The ruling regime in China needs to achieve consistent economic growth to ensure its survival. The Chinese are becoming progressively more educated and better informed about world affairs, and they are beginning to ask questions of their political masters and the decisions they make. So long as the communist regime can show that it is delivering improvements in people’s lives then its chances of survival are good, but if improvements are not seen, then increasing unrest and resentment among the Chinese can be expected. Therefore, economic growth is the priority for Chinese political leaders at present. This means that even though China may regard NW as part of its prestige, it is highly unlikely to commit the resources necessary to join the ‘big two’ powers. Furthermore, China has vital trade relationships with both the US and Europe, which it needs to maintain to ensure continued economic growth. Clearly, China’s trading partners would be angered if China was to massively expand its nuclear program, and the trade interactions would be jeopardized. If the trade relationships were spoiled, there would be less income for China, which would result in a tightening of budgets and presumably less money for the nuclear deterrent. Therefore, even if China’s leaders felt they could afford to invest in substantial enhancements to its NW in the short-term, this may well not be sustainable in the medium to long term. China urges the US and Russia to reduce their warhead numbers.5 This suggests that China would like to have parity of numbers with the ‘big two’ powers, but would much prefer that they cut their numbers to its level, rather than having to increase the size of its own arsenal to match theirs. As long as China feels it has sufficient NW (in terms of both numbers and capabilities) to deter a US (or indeed Russian) attack, it is unlikely to seek a significant expansion of its deterrent. India’s nuclear ambitions
Robert S. Norris Hans M. Kristensen, “NDRC: Nuclear Notebook: US Nuclear Forces 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (January/February 2007): 79 – 82. 20Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “NDRC: Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces 2007.,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (March/April 2007): 61 – 67.
19
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The question of whether India aspires to become a ‘small global’ nuclear power was also posed in the introduction. This is, in my view, more likely than China attempting to join the ‘big two’. India does not try seriously for arms control – for instance, it conducted five NW tests in 1998, long after the majority of the other nuclear powers ceased to test (the UK conducted its last test in 1991). However, economic factors are also critical in considering India. India’s infrastructure is generally very poor, and will require significant investment if it is not to hinder economic growth. To avoid investing in infrastructure in order to enhance NW capabilities would lead to a slowing in economic growth, which in turn would be likely to render the NW investment unsustainable in the longer term. A government which focused spending on NW, rather than on improving the lives of many millions of very poor Indians, would be likely to be voted out of power at the earliest opportunity. India is, like China, heavily reliant on its trade relationships with the west to facilitate its economic rise. The same issues as for China are relevant here – India will not want to risk spoiling its relationships with the west by conducting a step change in its NW program because of fear that if it did so, trade and thereby economic growth would be reduced. If trade were reduced, then the funding available for NW would also be reduced, and hence long-term substantial increases in investment into NW are likely to be unsustainable. India is currently considering whether to accept a deal on nuclear power with the US. There is no doubt that the US and India have grown much closer in recent years, and as a result of this it is probable that India may feel some protection from the US nuclear umbrella and may feel it does not need to indulge in significant enhancements to its NW. The greater strategic importance of the US-Indian relationship also renders the point in the paragraph above more imperative. It could be argued that Pakistan has also grown much closer to the US in recent years, which might be a source of anxiety for the Indians. However, it seems to me far more likely that the Pakistani relationship with the US will deteriorate than the India-US relationship. For example, President Musharraf’s actions in late 2007 in declaring a state of emergency in Pakistan and purging the supreme court have met with frustration and disapproval from the US administration.21 However, the importance of Pakistan in India’s nuclear thinking cannot be underestimated. India has conventional forces far superior to Pakistan’s (for instance, India has some 1.33 million active troops compared to Pakistan’s 619,000),22 and Pakistan seeks to compensate for this through its nuclear deterrent. The current political instability in Pakistan must be a prominent concern for India. That said, India has sufficient NW power to deter a Pakistani
21 22
See for instance http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,2204802,00.html. Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber. The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: Overview of Major Asian Powers, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 24.
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nuclear attack on its soil, no matter how large the latter’s deterrent is, and therefore would gain no extra security through an expansion of its own deterrent. This analysis leads to the conclusion that India is unlikely to try to join the ‘small global’ nuclear powers in the near future. However, in the longer term, perhaps in 50 years time when India’s economy is more mature and robust, and the wider world is more dependent on it than it is on them (rather than at present where the inverse is true) such an expansion is more of a possibility.
THE SINO-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP
The Sino-Indian relationship has historically been difficult. During the Cold War, there was close cooperation between Russia and India, and between China and Pakistan, which placed India and China in opposition. A border war in 1962 resulted in India’s humiliation. Furthermore, China aided Pakistan in the development of the latter’s NW program. The most significant events in recent Sino-Indian history are shown graphically in Figure 3.
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1954 8 year agreement on Tibet signed.
1971 China sides with Pakistan in 3rd Indo-Pakistan war. 1959 1984-7 India hosts Tensions in Dali Lama. border region. 1967 Nathu Lu and Chola border skirmishes. 1962 Sino-Indian war.
1998 Indian NW tests. 2003 China recognizes India’s claims to Sikkim border region.
Figure 3: A graphic representation of recent Sino-Indian history. At the present time, the relationship is improved: e.g. in December 2007, the two countries conducted a joint military exercise.23 There is a growing trade relationship (but also competition) between the two, and reports in 2005 stated that China had offered India a deal on nuclear power similar to that currently being brokered by the US.24 However, there is still
23 24
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7153179.stm. See for instance: http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2006/11/20/china_and_india_on_vergy_of_nuclear_deal /
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significant mistrust between the two powers. China still occupies tracts of land which India stakes claim to. India still hosts the Dalai Lama, which angers the Chinese. Overall, China’s conventional military might is probably greater than India’s – e.g. China has 2.26 million active troops compared to India’s 1.33 million.22 However, this is not completely straightforward to assess. For instance, India has an operational aircraft carrier, which China does not; in contrast, China has nuclear-powered submarines which India does not.22 Indian generals believe that they have learnt the necessary lessons from the 1962 war, and are confident that should China launch a conventional attack the Indian armed forces could win such a war. Thus, it is reasonable to assert that conventional power is largely balanced between the two states.
N U C L E A R I N T E R P L AY
At the present time, China and India exist in a state of mutual deterrence: either could cause unacceptable damage levels to the other. Given that, as discussed above, neither feels particularly threatened by the conventional might of the other, the current situation may be regarded as stable, and an arms race is therefore improbable. The analysis above concluded that neither China nor India is likely to substantially increase their nuclear arsenals, at least in the near future. If either power did decide to undertake such a program, the economic factors already discussed (i.e. the need for investment elsewhere to ensure economic growth) would seem to render it unlikely that the other would automatically follow suit. So long as the power which was not increasing its NW arsenal (Power A) felt it had sufficient weaponry to deter an attack from the other (Power B) (i.e. survive an attack and retaliate in the current doctrine used by both India and China), Power A would be likely to persist in investing its resources to ensure continued economic growth, rather than procure expensive and unnecessary NW. Neither power would want to risk the ire of the international community by massively enhancing its nuclear deterrent program purely for the sake of “keeping up with the neighbors”. There would seem to be much more advantage for Power A in continuing on a path of engagement with the international community, and gaining economic and political advantage from the fact that Power B was behaving in an irresponsible way inconsistent with world security. This means there is, in my view, little danger of a Sino-Indian arms race in the present political climate. However, there is any number of things which might change this situation. For instance, if India and the US moved much closer in their relationship, this might cause
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anxiety in China. Similarly, if a radical Islamist regime were to gain power in Pakistan, India would be forced to reconsider its nuclear posture. Furthermore, this article has considered China and India largely in isolation – clearly in reality the situation is not so simple. The actions of the other nuclear powers (see Figure 4) will have profound influences on the thinking in both India and China. The behavior of latent nuclear powers such as Japan, and countries which might seek to acquire nuclear weapons (e.g. Iran or Syria) will also be important.
The ‘big two’ powers Small global powers UK USA Russia France Regional powers
China Pakistan India Israel N Korea
Figure 4: A graphical representation of the world’s nuclear powers. A complex interaction dynamic involving all of these states determines the nuclear posture of each.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has considered the nuclear arsenals and doctrine of India and China, and has assessed whether either plans a significant expansion of its NW program. It has also addressed the issue of whether there is likely to be a nuclear arms race between the two. Both countries at present adopt a posture of credible minimum deterrence, in which they would aim to survive an attack and subsequently retaliate. Both are modernizing their nuclear arsenals, deploying increased numbers of warheads and more capable delivery vehicles, but the evidence suggests this is in order to ensure the survivability of their
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deterrents – particularly important with a minimum deterrence posture – rather than comprising the intent to seek a step change in deterrent capabilities. The modernization is in several ways interesting, however, because in the US and UK policymakers and program managers constantly reassess their deterrence needs and look for ways to minimize and streamline programs expending significant effort considering who and what we are deterring. In contrast to this, China and India seem to have no difficulty identifying potential aggressors. Owing to the tremendous significance to both countries of achieving consistent economic growth, investment in the near future will likely be focused towards achieving this, rather than an expensive and probably unnecessary radical enhancement of NW capabilities. This means both countries are likely to stay in the same ballpark of capabilities in the short term at least, and a nuclear arms race is improbable. That said, there are a number of other factors worthy of consideration (not least the behavior of the other NW powers), and the currently stable situation could change to become more volatile. An interesting question worthy of further consideration is the matter of how the world (and in particular the UK and US) would react should either China or India substantially expand their NW programs. The application of sanctions to North Korea in an attempt to stop it seeking a nuclear bomb was relatively facile owing to the isolation of the North Korean regime from the international community (of course, it remains to be seen how successful this approach will turn out to have been). A similar situation is true for Iran. In contrast, both China and India are now extensively integrated into the international community, and are playing ever greater roles in the world politically. For instance, China is heavily involved in Africa, offering aid often accepted in preference to aid from western nations because the latter comes with significant strings attached, requiring recipient countries to improve human rights.25 Indian peacekeepers are deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.26 The economic influence of both states should also not be underestimated. As the US economy slows, in order for the world economy to continue growing, significant growth in the emerging economies (including those of India and China) will be needed. This means that the application of sanctions would have a very profound and far-reaching effect on the world, resulting in the probability that many nations would not countenance imposing them should either China or India decide to substantially expand their NW programs. In the near-term future, where the balance of power probably still lies with western nations, this is perhaps not a worry. In 50 or 100 years, however, when China and
25
See for instance http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7155414.stm and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7086777.stm. 26 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4091586.stm.
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India have the world’s largest economies it is very definitely something worthy of consideration.
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Russia’s Future: The Precarious Balance between Russian Energy and Military Strategy
SUSAN S. VOSS1
ABSTRACT
The Russian government is currently at a cross roads between establishing their preeminence as a trusted supplier of world energy versus advancing an increasingly defensive military policy and greater government controls. Having survived the post Soviet Union breakup economic crisis and the pain that came with converting from a government-controlled system to privatization, Russia is on the verge of yet another transformation. Russia is now transitioning towards a hybrid of government/private ownership with key industrial and energy-related companies. Major financing and government support is being provided to support these strategic companies and to foster the Russian energy policy both domestically and internationally. Russian policy may have a significant impact on the world’s energy security. Further implementation of the Russian energy policy will require international trust in the Russian government and their ability to meet their commitments. It will require an overall trust in Russian industry and manufacturing to meet international standards for quality and safety. At the same time, and in an apparently contradictory fashion, the Russian government and the military are becoming increasingly defensive on the world stage. The Russian government is publicly touting the advancement of their strategic nuclear weapons and the need for tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, the reduction of personal freedoms and increased control of the government and secret service, the FSB, have raised concerns that Russia may be returning to a closed society. In turn, these changes raise doubts and concerns about Russia’s ability to meet their international energy commitments. This report provides an overview of the Russian energy policy with an emphasis on the changes within the Nuclear Energy Agency, Rosatom, and Russia’s more aggressive international behavior. It includes a short presentation of the dichotomy that appears to be emerging within Russia between the desire to be an international provider of stable power versus their more threatening demeanor to the US and their neighboring countries. This
1
S. Voss has been a technical staff member at Los Alamos National Laboratory for the past 22 years and has recently left LANL to establish an engineering consulting company, Global Nuclear Network Analysis, LLC. Contact: svoss@gnna.net (LA-UR-08-0114)
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apparent dichotomy opens new opportunities for the international community to support Russia’s overall goals through their desire to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 123 Agreement and other instruments that support free trade and an open economy while at the same dealing directly with Russian fears. The time for providing international aid and support to Russia is ending and it is now time to define a new relationship as partners on the world stage. Timing is critical, as the issues facing the Russian government are of grave concern and could tip the scale in a negative direction.
RU S S I A N E N E RG Y S T R A T E G Y
Russia accounts for 13% of the world’s territory and roughly 2.1% of the world’s population. They are the 9th largest country based upon population and have a negative growth rate of approximately 0.5%.2 More importantly, Russia has some of the largest energy resources of the world’s including: 1. The world’s largest reserves of natural gas, estimated at 29% of the world’s total,2 and nearly twice the reserves of the next largest country, Iran.3 They are also the world’s top producer and exporter of natural gas. 2. An estimated 13% of the world’s oil reserves, 8th overall and the 2nd largest producer and exporter. It is reported that they periodically produce more than the number one producer, Saudi Arabia.3 3. An estimated 20% of the world’s coal reserves, 2nd largest amount of recoverable coal and 5th highest exporter in 2005.4 4. An estimated 14% of the world’s uranium. Currently Russia is extracting approximately 3000- 3200 MT of natural uranium per year but has an annual requirement of 16,000 - 18,000 MT to meet both domestic and international needs.5 In 2003, the Russian government established an aggressive energy policy that provides guidelines for a long-term state energy policy including energy safety, energy efficiency,
CIA World Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html. Russia Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis - Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal, EIA, 4/25/2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/pdf.pdf. 4 Russia’s Position, Summit 2006 G-8, http://en.g8russia.ru/agenda/nrgsafety/russianrole/index-print.html. 5 Kazakstan Nuclear Future, 8/14/2007, UPI. 5 Nuclear Industry Russia: Power Industry May Face Uranium Shortage by 2010, 8/15/2006, Mirovaya Energetika.
2 3
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budget efficiency and environmental energy security.6 The energy goals also include increasing the export of energy resources by 45 to 64% by 2020. The energy strategy is identified as the “basis of economic development and the instrument of carrying out the internal and external policy.”6 As the price of oil and gas increased, so has the impact of sales of these products on the Russian economy.
Figure 1: Net US Import of Russian of Petroleum into the US (1995-2005) 3* *Blue export of crude and red export of crude + products (‘000 bbl/d)
Figure 2: EIA Figures Showing Russian Export by Year of Total Liquids Production versus Consumption and Russian Natural Gas Production versus Consumption3 On December 13, 2006 V. Mezhevich, the First Vice Chairman of the Federation Council Commission on Natural Monopolies, estimated that the sale of oil and gas contributed to 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP), greater than 60% of the currency in-flow and 50% of the tax revenues stating that the fuel and energy complex remain the locomotive of
6
Summary of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of Up to 2020, Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2003, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/events/doc/2003_strategy_2020_en.pdf.
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Russia’s social-economic development.7 In December 2005, Russian President Putin presented the National Energy Strategy to the Russian Security Council and stated “Russia has a competitive, natural and technological advantage and must become an energy superpower to retain political leadership in the world.”8 Russian energy policy is integrated with their international policy and their desire to regain their status as a super-power within the world. To meet these goals, the Russian government has stated that it intends to increase the production of domestic power by nuclear and hydro-generation to allow for greater export of fossil fuels.9 Russian government officials have publicly acknowledged the importance of being reliable partners in the energy field by establishing trust. Some examples include: 1. Vladimir Putin’s speech at the G8 Energy Ministers meeting in March 2006, in which he stated, “Our country, as you know, is the world’s biggest gas exporter and the second-biggest exporter of oil and oil products, and we make a considerable contribution to ensuring global and regional energy security. We value our deserved reputation as a serious and responsible partner on the energy resources markets.”10 2. The summary of the 2003 Energy Strategy, which avers that “the State energy policy must be directed on the change from the role of supplier of raw resources to the role of substantive member of the world energy market….remaining the stable and reliable partner for the European countries and for the whole world community.”6 Based upon these two official comments from the Russian President and from documented official energy strategy, it is clear that the importance of maintaining a predictable partnership in energy is imperative for Russia. Yet Russia’s actions have cast doubt on their reliability and therefore, their ability to provide long-term energy supplies. Russia’s hardnosed negotiations with Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia over ownership of the key pipelines, gas prices and supply have made other countries nervous about partnering with Russia on critical energy supplies. Based upon statements by the Russian government, the negotiations were strictly in line with establishing contracts consistent with world pricing, but to others it was perceived as political maneuvering.
Rosatom web site, Parliamentary hearings “Energy Strategy of Russia: Problems and Prospects” held in Federation Council Dec 12, 2006. 8 RFE/RL, 2/15/2006. 9 Russia Electricity, EIA, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Electricity.html. 10 Vladimir Putin’s speech at Meeting with the G8 Energy Ministers, 3/16/2006, http://en.g8russia.ru/news/20060316/1145793.
7
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As an example, in response to Gazprom’s expansion into the countries of EU’s energy distribution networks and over fears that Russia may not be an entirely responsible partner, the European Union (EU) began to establish a unified energy policy in September of 2007. The new policy will cover 27 countries and it is represented as a means to boost competition by “breaking up utilities that control both the production as well as the delivery of energy.”11 This new policy will primarily impact Russia’s Gazprom, which has been systematically purchasing parts of the energy distribution networks within EU countries. Gazprom provides 25% of Europe’s gas. It is reported that Gazprom is present in 17 EU countries through joint ventures, subsidiaries or stakes.11 According to a report by J. Donovan, Gazprom gained control of Italy’s energy distribution network in 2007 and obtained 50% ownership in Germany’s Wingas, which controls 2,000 kilometers of pipelines in Germany and Europe’s largest underground gas depot.11 The Russian state has been the primary share holder of Gazprom since the beginning of 2006 with 50.002% ownership. The Chairman of the Board of Directors is Dmitry Medvedev, the First Deputy Prime Minister12 and recently named as the person Putin endorses to be his successor as president. Gazprom produces nearly 90% of Russia’s natural gas and operates Russia’s gas pipeline network. The purchase of key energy distribution systems in other countries raises the question of whether or not this is political or business oriented? As world-wide energy prices rise, it will be interesting to note the political interplay between Russia and those countries that rely on Russia for a large percentage of their carbon-based energy. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the following countries were the major recipients of Russian natural gas exports for 2005: Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
11
Country Germany Italy Turkey France Hungary Czech Rep Austria Poland Slovakia Finland Romania
Imports (bcf/yr) 1291 624 630 406 294 252 246 226 225 148 140
% of Dom. Consumption 43% 30% 65% 26% 62% 84% 70% 47% 108% 105% 23%
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 175, Part I, 20 September 2007 EU THROWS DOWN GAUNTLET TO RUSSIA'S GAZPROM, J. Donovan. 12 Gazprom Official Website, 12/29/2007, http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article8511.shtml.
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Rank 12 13
Country
Imports (bcf/yr) Fmr Yugoslavia 134 Bulgaria 101 (bcf-billion cubic feet)
% of Dom. Consumption 57% 89%
EIA estimates for sales to Baltic and CIS States for 2005: Rank Country 1 2 3 4 5 Ukraine Belarus Baltic States Azerbaijan Georgia Imports % of Dom. (bcf/yr) Consumption 2,113 79% 710 100% 205 100% 120 36% 46 100%
The Russian supply of natural gas provides for a large percentage of total domestic use for a number of key countries that will be discussed in other parts of the report. Two key countries are Poland and the Czech Republic, which receive 47% and 84% of their domestic gas from Russia, respectively. Given Russian concern over the US deployment of the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) system in Poland and the Czech Republic, energy supplies to these countries could become embroiled in politics and used as a bargaining chip. Two of the major oil importers, Italy and France, have established nuclear manufacturing partnerships. Implementation of Russian Energy Strategy For Russia to achieve their goals as an energy superpower, the Russian government plans on investing in the internal energy infrastructure, oil and gas distribution network, and in increasing oil and gas production and export; coal production, power production from NPPs, and the number of hydro-electric stations.6 Their goal is to increase the energy production from nuclear power plants from 16% in 2000 to 23% in 2020 with up to 32% of the power production in the Western part of Russia.6 If Russia fails to implement a plan to replace nuclear power plants that will be shutdown, then by 2030 nuclear power will account for only 1 to 2% of the overall energy output.13 As the overall production of oil and gas increases and the percentage of power produced domestically from gas is reduced through the construction of new NPPs, coal burning plants and hydro-electric plants, it will allow the higher export of gas internationally thereby providing hard currency back into the Russian economy.
13
President Putin’s Opening Remarks at Meeting with Heads of the Russian Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy Complexes, 6/9/2006. www.Kremlin.ru.
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The Russian government has reasserted control over key energy sectors and has created a new type of hybrid-corporation to achieve the national energy goals. This is also consistent with Putin’s 1999 goals to vertically integrate power back to the central government. Two examples of this new type of government-owned, private corporation, are Gazprom and Rosatom. Gazprom is the “world’s largest gas company and they possess the world’s largest gas reserve.”12 Gazprom also appears to support the government policies through the purchase of private assets and companies. A second example is the Rosatom Corporation that was recently converted from a government agency to a government-owned, private corporation. This conversion enables Rosatom to act like a government agency with respect to establishing international and domestic government agreements and in implementing the government defense order for production of nuclear weapons and as a private corporation for the construction of nuclear power plants both domestically and internationally. Rosatom will also be allowed to reinvest their profits into the corporation as needed without direction from the State Duma. Rosatom, Incorporated When I first visited Russia in the early 1990’s almost all oversight and funding from the Ministry of Atomic Energy, Minatom, to the nuclear institutes had ended. The institutes were left on their own to find means of survival with little financing or support. They were forced to find new partners that left them open to a myriad of new problems including technology transfer and nuclear diversions. The Soviet-era system was not designed to account, control or protect nuclear material within an open society. Given the large quantities of nuclear material stored at multiple sites including the 100’s of metric tons (MTs) of materials that were converted from nuclear weapons for either storage or downblended nuclear fuel, it is surprising that there were so few issues during this time. Rosatom is now under-going a major transformation as one of the cornerstones of the Russian energy policy. The expansion of domestic nuclear power is one of the key ways that Russia will be able to export more oil and gas. Rosatom has established a plan to implement a series of critical steps including extending the lifetime of operating nuclear power plants, decommissioning older nuclear power plants and building replacement power plants for the decommissioned nuclear power plants. Currently Russia generates 16% of their power needs by nuclear power and a goal to expand to 25% by 2030 during a period of time in which 50% of their older nuclear power plants will be shutdown. To achieve the 2003 Russian energy goals requires a novel and radical means of addressing past problems. New leadership and vision is required. A second part of the proposed expansion is to target the international market for new nuclear power plants including the associated infrastructure and fuel, thereby gaining a prominent role in international manufacturing and construction. Currently Russia leads in new NPP construction world-wide with two under construction in China, two in
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India, one in Iran and two in Bulgaria. In addition, Russia maintains leadership internationally in supplying enriched uranium and nuclear fuel. Fifty percent of US low enriched uranium (LEU) for power NPPs and 40% of the world market is exported from Russia.14 To achieve its nuclear power goals, the Russian government has implemented a series of specific steps over the past two years: The clarity of purpose and speed of implementation that they have been able to reform, consolidate, acquire and align the nuclear power and nuclear weapons industry within Russia is simply amazing! Some of the key events for meeting the nuclear-related goals of the energy policy include: 1. 11/2005: Appointment of Sergey Kiriyenko as the head of Rosatom. Kiriyenko established a new team to take the leadership of Rosatom. 2. 1/20/2006 Kiriyenko and his team establish an aggressive plan to meet the domestic and international nuclear power goals. The plan was presented to President Putin. Under Kirienko’s leadership many of the key directors of the Rosatom organization, institutes and export companies are replaced with business-oriented experts and past associates. 3. 6/6/06 Approval of the Program for Russian Nuclear Industry Development was granted by President Putin. The umbrella plan covers both civilian and military nuclear programs. 4. 10/6/2006 Federal Target Program (FTP) for the Development of the Nuclear Power Industry Complex for 2007 to 2010 and Further to 2015 was approved by President Putin. The plan laid out 1,471 B-Ruble (~$55.5B) spending for 9 years with 674.8 B-Rubles (~$25.4B) to be provided from the Federal budget and 796.6 BRubles (~$26.5B) from the nuclear sector budget and private investment. See Figure 5 for an overview of the funding by investment area. The plan covers: a. Extending the lifetime of existing NPPs; b. Building 26 new VVER-1000’s and the next generation VVER-1200 reactors by 2030; c. Building the next generation fast breeder reactor, the BN-800 by 2012; d. Building new NPP’s internationally;
14
Today, First Vice Premier of Russia Sergey Ivanov and the head of Rosatom Sergey Kiriyenko are to visit Kovrov, 4/20/2007, Rosatom.ru.
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e. Funding to advance manufacturing;
uranium
mining,
uranium
enrichment,
fuel
f. Funding to advance spent nuclear fuel (SNF) reprocessing and MOX fuel manufacturing; g. Consolidation and storage of SNF from RBMK-type reactors and VVER1000 reactors; and h. Advanced reactor concepts and technology.
Figure 5: Overview of the Investment Strategy for the Russian NPP Development Program ($B based upon a 26.5 R/$) 5. 2/26/2007 President Putin approved the “Tunnel Law”15 approving the establishment of Atomenergoprom within Rosatom and the transfer of 55 State Unitary Enterprises (nuclear institutes) to become part of the corporation. 6. 2007: Development of the FTP for New Technologies Platform, i.e., funding for the next generation fast breeder reactor, reprocessing and mixed-oxide fuel manufacturing.
15
*”Federal Law on the Special Terms of Management and Disposal of Assets and Shares of Organizations Operating in the Area of Atomic Energy Uses and Amendments to Certain Leg. Acts of the Russian Federation”
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7. 2007 Possible approval of the FTP for Nuclear Weapons Development, described in the Nuclear Development plan as “implementation of Russia’s nuclear control policy until 2015 and further by means of: strengthening of research, experimental, and production bases of the nuclear defense complex within the FTP Development of the Nuclear Weapons Complex for 2007-2010 and until 2015.”16 8. 7/13/2007 Approval of the 132 B-Ruble (~$5.5B) FTP on Nuclear and Radiation Safety. This is a key program that includes nuclear material accounting, control, protection, consolidation and reduction. It also includes site clean-up, spent nuclear fuel storage, and site restoration. 9. 11/13/2007 Approval of law to convert Rosatom to a State corporation approved by the State Duma. 11/23/2007 Approval of law to convert Rosatom to a State corporation approved by the Federation Council. 12/3/2007 Approval of law to convert Rosatom to a State corporation approved by President Putin. 10. 12/12/2007 S. Kiriyenko appointed as the head of new Rosatom Corporation by President Putin. Approval State Corporation. Rosatom is only one of many new State Corporations created in 2007. The State Corporation came into being in 2004 and establishes an organization and its assets as fully State owned, reporting to the President of Russia. They are able to keep and reinvest their earnings. The State Corporations match up with the 49 strategic industries in which foreign investment and ownership is limited. 11. 12/12/2007 Rosatom announced plans to build a 30 B-Ruble ($1.2B) office complex to house their new corporate headquarters within Moscow. The complex will house Rosatom and AtomEnergoProm. Construction to start in 2008. 12. 3/1/2008 Structural reforms of Rosatom to be completed and the President of Russia to decree on the transfer of powers from the Federal Agency for Nuclear Energy to Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation.17
16 17
Russian Program for Russian Nuclear Industry Development, 6/8/2006. Rosatom.ru, 12/19/2007.
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Figure 6: New Structure for Rosatom Corporation (based upon review of information) The creation of State Corporations, such as Rosatom Corporation, creates a new type of position within the Russian government. S. Kiriyenko as head of the Rosatom Corporation has the right to negotiate as a government entity, and yet, will be compensated as a corporate manager. This has lead to the new term “State Oligarch.” Within Rosatom a new corporation has been established, AtomEnergoProm (AEP) which is the commercial entity that integrates all sectors of the Russian nuclear industry from uranium mining and purchases through spent nuclear fuel recovery and reprocessing. AEP is the vertical integration of technology and capability. In September, 2007 Vladimir Travin was appointed the new Director of AEP. Because AEP is a State Corporation, it has the full support of the Russian government, including the President, in establishing international agreements. It will be of great interest to see how this new type of entity – part Private Corporation and part State organization will fair in the international business arena. More than half of the proposed budget for the development FTP on nuclear power is from sources other than the Federal Government and it is unclear from where this funding will come. One of the key sources of funding appears to be through the government-owned, private corporations including TVEL, TENEX and Gazprom. One example is the creation of Atomenergomash, which was founded under TVEL in 2006 for the purpose of manufacturing nuclear power plant equipment. It is reported that Atomenergomash spent over $250M in 2007 acquiring new assets in Russia and internationally in an effort to expand their manufacturing capability.18 New assets include the acquisition of private companies that
18
By the end of this year Atomenergomash is going to get 100% of shares of Arako spol. s.r.o. (Czech Republic), 5/12/2007, Rosatom web site.
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are needed to manufacture new nuclear power plants. The Atomenergomash Company is planning on manufacturing equipment for four nuclear power plants per year. One of the key benefits in the Russian government exerting control over their nuclear institutes and companies is the increased emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation resulting in a decrease in nuclear diversions. Some of the important changes to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation since 2000 include: 1. Establishment and implementation of Russian physical protection requirements; 2. Conducting audits of the sites against the physical protection requirements; 3. Large scale, multi-agency security exercises at the Rosatom sites; 4. Reported changes in management for noncompliance to MPC&A; and 5. New FTP for 132 B-Rubles (~$6.5B) for 7 years to address nuclear safety and security. It is, and always has been, Russia’s responsibility to secure their nuclear materials. The US and other countries provided Russian institutes with the means to account, protect, consolidate and eliminate their nuclear material by providing equipment, training, and funding. Providing support to Russia to safeguard, consolidate and eliminate their nuclear materials may be one of the greatest single investments made by the international community. But stewardship of their nuclear materials and weapons remained a Russian responsibility; and Rosatom has begun to place substantial financial resources to fund this activity. As a business man, S. Kiriyenko has emphasized the importance of ensuring security of Russia’s nuclear materials. Rosatom is becoming financially independent as part of the energy strategy and it is therefore time to transition US interactions from support for material safeguards to interactions focused on the next generation of nuclear power, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and advanced fuel manufacturing. Safe development of the future nuclear fuel cycle is in fact the next great challenge for nuclear nonproliferation. The US is behind Russia in the planning and implementation of future nuclear power capability; but while the US has focused on nuclear security, the Russians have focused on the advancement of nuclear pow